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LAWYERING FOR GROUPS:
THE CASE OF AMERICAN INDIAN
TRIBAL ATTORNEYS
Kristen A. Carpenter* & Eli Wald**
Lawyering for groups, broadly defined as the legal representation of a
client who is not an individual, is a significant and booming phenomenon.
Encompassing the representation of governments, corporations,
institutions, peoples, classes, communities, and causes, lawyering for
groups is what many, if not most, lawyers do. And yet, the dominant theory
of law practice—the Standard Conception, with its principles of zealous
advocacy, nonaccountability, and professional role-based morality—and
the rules of professional conduct that codify it, continue to be premised on
the basic antiquated assumption that the paradigmatic client-attorney
relationship is between an individual client and an individual attorney. The
result is a set of rules and a theory of law practice that often ill fit the
practice of group lawyers.
This Article explores the theoretical and practical challenges of group
lawyering through the study of lawyers for American Indian tribes. We
believe that a focus on tribal lawyers furthers two important goals. First,
the individualistic impulse of the dominant theory of law practice is so
ingrained that it forecloses the possibility of challenging and imagining
genuine group-based alternatives. In order to truly see the shortcomings of
the Standard Conception and conceive of alternatives to it, one must start
not with an abstract theory of group representation, but with a detailed
study of the meaning, needs, interests, and realities of actual groups and
build a corresponding theory from the ground up. Second, the story of
tribal lawyers, an important narrative of both the legal profession and of
tribes, is still largely untold. This Article thus aims to challenge the
homogeneity of the Standard Conception of law practice and to begin the
process of imagining group-based alternatives to it, while at the same time
telling part of the story of tribal lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s scholars of the legal profession are asking profound questions
about what changes in the practice of law mean for global governance,
including issues of corporate power, state sovereignty, and human rights.1
This conversation necessarily entails consideration of the many forms of
client organization, and indeed human association, comprising our
profession and society. And, yet, the conversation is stymied by the
absence of theoretical and descriptive accounts capturing the phenomenon
of lawyering for groups. Instead, the professional obligations of lawyers
remain largely conscripted to a model of individual lawyering, envisioning
a lawyer representing a singular person or entity in litigation, that fails to
1. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins & Mihaela Papa, The Rise of the Corporate Legal Elite
in the BRICS: Implications for Global Governance 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1–3).
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account for developments in the practice of law.2 This gap in the
scholarship, in turn, reflects insufficient treatment of group lawyering in the
rules regulating the profession.
In this Article, we explore the challenges of group lawyering through the
study of lawyers for American Indian tribes—groups that have, for
hundreds of years, engaged lawyers in their multifaceted, intergenerational
struggles to survive the forces of conquest and colonization. Today, there
are 566 federally recognized Indian tribes, most of which engage lawyers as
advocates in their quest for political self-determination, cultural and
religious freedom, and socioeconomic well-being.3 Indian tribes share
some common characteristics with other groups and entities, namely that
they are collective associations of individuals often united by history,
kinship, language, and culture, and bound together by social, economic, and
political concerns. On the other hand, as we describe below, tribes are also
different from many groups in the United States in that they are recognized
as sovereigns, with reserved rights of governance over their territories and
citizens.4 Despite the extensive and rich experiences of the lawyers who
represent tribes, these stories have for the most part escaped notice in the
professional responsibility literature.
We believe that a focus on tribal lawyers furthers two important goals.
First, the individualistic impulse of the basic model of law practice and its
emerging alternatives is so ingrained that it forecloses the possibility of
challenging and imagining genuine group-based alternatives. In order to
truly see the shortcomings of the basic model and conceive of alternatives
to it, one must start not with an abstract theory of group representation, but
with a detailed study of the meaning, needs, interests, and realities of actual
groups and build a corresponding theory from the ground up. Second, the
story of tribal lawyers, an important narrative of both the legal profession
and of tribes, is still largely untold. This Article thus aims to challenge the
homogeneity of the standard conception of law practice and to begin the
2. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976) (describing the (then) relatively new phenomenon of lawyering for
groups).
3. For background on American Indian tribes and their contemporary situations, see
ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF, AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY, 1–13 (2008). Like this and other sources, our
Article uses the terms “American Indian” and “Native American” interchangeably.
4. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 4.01 (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2005). Beyond the foundational concept of Indian tribes as political sovereigns within the
U.S. legal system, there is a great deal of scholarship considering various legal, political,
sociological, racial, cultural, and religious aspects of Indian tribes vis-à-vis other groups.
While we cannot replicate these arguments here, we refer the reader to the following articles
and sources cited therein. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood,
27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 344–63 (2008) (drawing from political, sociological, and legal
theory on groups, associations, and political entities to describe American Indian tribes as
“peoples” entitled to treatment as such in litigation about property and religion); Angela R.
Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 807–38 (2007) (situating
the “sovereign” status of tribes within domestic and international literature on minority
groups and human rights).
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process of imagining group-based alternatives to it, while at the same time
telling part of the story of tribal lawyers.
We should be clear at the outset that the story we tell is neither
exhaustive nor general; each of the several hundred tribes has its own
experience, culture, and objectives in legal representation, which we can
only begin to evoke here. Moreover, we do not wish to overstate the role of
lawyers in the historic survival or contemporary revitalization of Indian
tribes, much of which is attributable to the resilience of tribal members and
lifeways rather than the law or legal profession. Nevertheless, there are
lessons to draw from our analysis of tribal lawyering, and they are broader
than simply identifying a list of potential revisions to particular rules—for
example, to include references to cultural literacy as an aspect of attorney
competence (though that would be a good start). Rather, we argue that the
story of tribal lawyers reveals an overarching need to create space for
competing diverse visions and professional ideologies to emerge alongside
the dominant ideology of the standard conception—ideologies that will in
turn inform and shape the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
role of lawyers for both groups and individuals.
Finally, to the extent that American individualism, as a broad-based
social and cultural phenomenon, is the cause of lawyers’ rules of conduct
and professional ideologies, revising the rules and rethinking the ideology
that informs them may accomplish little. Similarly, to the extent that the
subordination of American Indians reflects deep historical, political, racial,
and economic factors, any changes to the legal profession may promise
only modest remedial effect. We believe, however, that professional rules
and roles not only reflect but also shape and inform the conduct of
American lawyers and that challenging the dominant standard conception
may result in more effective and empowering lawyering for groups,
including Indian tribes.
In Part I, we describe the “Standard Conception,” the dominant
professional ideology that undergirds the American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as based on a model of
individual lawyering that fails to reflect the challenges of lawyering for
groups, and further explain why the example of tribal lawyering is an
illuminating example. In Part II, we provide a short history of American
Indian tribal lawyering, situating the role of the contemporary tribal
attorney against the history of American Indian experiences in the legal
system and analyzing a rich set of examples from the American Indian Law
literature describing and theorizing the role of the tribal attorney. In Part
III, we explore how the basic features of the Standard Conception—that is,
zealous advocacy, nonaccountability, and professional role-based
morality—as well as specific rules of conduct that codify it sometimes fit
poorly with the representation of Indian tribes and other groups. In Part IV,
we synthesize the lessons learned from our study of tribal lawyers and the
legal profession and compare and contrast them with the experiences of
other lawyers for groups, including government, public interest,
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community, and class action attorneys. Our analysis generalizes some of
the lessons from tribal lawyering and other instances of lawyering for
groups to expose the limitations of the Standard Conception and the rules of
professional conduct. Finally, we identify and describe new professional
rules and statements emerging from Indian Country, suggesting that these
models begin to contemplate aspects of effective representation, client
empowerment, and personal identity as they inform tribal representation
and may enlighten the practice of group lawyers more broadly.
I. LAWYERING FOR GROUPS: A PRACTICE IN SEARCH OF A THEORY
Historically, the practice of law involved an individual client represented
by an individual attorney.5 And while practice realities have evolved—
clients now include corporations, communities, governments, and causes;
lawyers include law firms of all sizes and sorts; and representation includes
litigation, negotiation, mediation, lobbying, and other activities—the theory
of law practice and the regulation of lawyers have been slow to catch up.
Theories of law practice and lawyers’ professional identity by and large
assume and address the role of individual lawyers. And the regulation of
lawyers, notably the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules)
and the state rules based on them, continue to, if only implicitly, assume
and regulate individual lawyers, representing individual clients in
litigation.6
Within this framework, the dominant theory of law practice is the
Standard Conception, a role-morality theory based on the twin principles of
zealous advocacy and lawyers’ nonaccountability for the goals they help
clients bring about. The Standard Conception treats individual lawyers as
the focus of inquiry, has little to nothing to say about law firms, and
assumes, often implicitly, individual clients. The leading critics of the
Standard Conception, both those who accept role morality and argue about
the details of its guiding principles and those who reject role morality in
favor of common morality, all similarly assume the lawyer and client to be
individuals.7
It is therefore not surprising that the vast majority of the Rules that
implement and give life to the Standard Conception purport to regulate the
conduct of individual lawyers assumed to be serving individual clients. The
sole exception when it comes to lawyering for groups is Rule 1.13, titled
Organization As Client, providing: “A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.”8 Rule 1.13 then addresses substantive and structural aspects
5. See generally David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case:
Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 468 (1990).
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2012).
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of representing organizational clients, which largely involve ascertaining
the “best interests” of the organization and observing the chain of
“authority” in communications with officers.9 In these and other ways, the
Rule reduces the multiplicity of persons and interests potentially involved
in organizational representation into a single “legal entity” model.10 Put
differently, Rule 1.13, the only Rule that purports to deal with clients who
are not individuals, largely likens organizations to individuals for purposes
of articulating the lawyer’s professional obligations.
There is, of course, legal precedent for treating organizational clients like
individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court long ago held that corporations are
legal persons11 and, as a practical matter, it is helpful for lawyers to be able
to rely on corporate hierarchies (such as the authority of the chief executive
officer) and norms (like the business judgment rule) to shape their
representation of clients who observe them.12 Yet deeming corporations
legal persons such that they can enter into binding legal contracts, sue, and
be sued is very different than assuming either that corporations are legal
persons for all purposes or that groups of people are akin to corporate
entities. As scholars have begun to discuss, some client groups, such as
governments, communities, and causes, are not organizations in the
corporate sense, and representing them requires a more nuanced approach
than merely treating them as such.13 These and other groups raise major
questions for legal representation—including the challenges of determining
the group’s objectives, ascertaining who speaks for the group, and
addressing divergent constituencies within it—that remain largely
unaddressed by the rules pertaining to individual clients.
As the legal profession continues to grow, some scholars have criticized
the “one-size-fits-all” Standard Conception and regulatory approach
adhered to by the organized bar and its leaders. With so many lawyers
doing so many different things, it is hard to see how the myth of the “One
Bar” can be sustained. Any professional ideology and rules of professional
conduct purporting to suit everybody may end up being a poor fit for many,
and a more contextual framework may be needed. Our claim, however, is a
related but slightly different one. We argue that not only are the Standard
Conception and the Rules that built on it—with their core commitments to
individualism, autonomy, and the pursuit of self-interest—sometimes a
poor fit for group lawyers, but that they also tend to obscure, if not

9. Id. R. 1.13(b).
10. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (defining an organizational client broadly as “a legal entity”).
11. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
12. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
13. See infra Part IV.
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altogether preempt, important questions about the rule of law and the role
lawyers play in contemporary society.14
To explore and substantiate our argument about the need for a theory of
group lawyering, we turn to the context of tribal lawyers. By the term
“tribal lawyers,” we mean lawyers for Indian tribes, and particularly for the
hundreds of federally recognized tribes that maintain a political relationship
with the United States. We do not focus on lawyers for individual Indians,
Indian-owned businesses, or tribal judges except to the extent they are
implicated by the question of tribal lawyering. The historical, cultural, and
political contexts in which tribes engage lawyers reveal the limitations of a
model of professional responsibility that treats groups as faceless
individuals, without any particularized consideration of the group’s internal
structure or values, its relationship with the society around it, or its
aspirations for the future. As we describe below, some of the issues raised
by tribal lawyering are specific to American Indian experiences and others
are illuminating to broader questions of lawyering for groups.
American Indian tribes had, by the time Europeans arrived in the “new
world,” already been living according to their own traditional laws and
cultural norms for thousands of years. Tribal leaders, who traditionally
performed internal dispute resolution and external diplomacy functions,
found themselves on the front lines in treaty negotiations with European
nations in the seventeenth century. Some of tribes’ first experiences with
Anglo-American lawyers came in mid-nineteenth century litigation over
treaty rights, with mixed results.15 Since the 1800s, Indian tribes have been
hiring lawyers to represent them in matters local, national, and
international, wherein the tribe is nearly always, in one way or another,
fighting for its survival in a difficult legal landscape. Today, tribal
governments, particularly through their executive and legislative branches,
engage lawyers to represent the tribe on a variety of matters, from litigation
and business dealings with third parties, to internal legal reform and
institution building. Tribes have formed offices of in-house counsel16 and
attorneys general, whose responsibilities may be enumerated in the tribal

14. For an evocative theoretical discussion of the role of lawyers in promoting
democracy, see, for example, Aziz Rana, Statesman or Scribe: Legal Independence and the
Problem of Democratic Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1665 (2009).
15. See generally MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY
OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS 13–55 (2012)
(describing the role of traditional leaders or ogemuk in certain Anishinabe societies); ROBERT
A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW
AND PEACE, 1600–1800 (1997) (describing the early treaty experiences of Haudensaunee,
Delaware, Shawnee, Fox, Cherokee, Creek, and other tribes).
16. See, e.g., The Tulalip Tribes of Washington Office of Reservation Attorney, TULALIP
TRIBES, http://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/LegalReservation
Attorney.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (“The mission of the Office of Reservation
Attorney is to support, defend and advance the interests of the Tulalip Tribes of Washington
by providing quality legal services to tribal policy makers and staff.”).
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constitution or legislative code.17 When it comes to standards of
representation, many tribes have adopted their own rules of professional
responsibility dictating that tribal lawyers should serve their clients much as
any other lawyer would in the organizational model of Rule 1.13.18
As Judge William Canby has succinctly explained, today’s tribal attorney
is “often a major influence on tribal affairs.”19 It is against this backdrop
that we pose the question of whether the Rules’ approach of analogizing
tribes to individual clients based on the Standard Conception theory of law
practice, is a sensible one. Many tribal rules of professional responsibility
borrow from the ABA’s Model Rules, and for the most part they initially
seem to work relatively well in guiding lawyers who represent tribes.20
And yet complex challenges of culture, history, constituency, agency,
representation, and identity arise. First, the very understanding of the role
of the lawyer as zealous advocate in an adversarial system may be culturally
and politically antithetical to tribal societies in which the operative norms
favor the collective well-being of the group and values such as harmony and
balance. Furthermore, the assumption that the client seeks to pursue its
autonomy and advance its goals in an adversarial fashion to the exclusion of
others does not always reflect tribal objectives.
Second, as described in greater detail below, any legal representation of
American Indian tribes confronts the weight of history in which law has
often been used to legitimize egregious moments of European conquest and
American colonization—such as the dispossession of Indian lands,
relocation of Indian people, and destruction of Indian religions and
17. See, e.g., AG Opinions, CHEROKEE NATION, http://ag.cherokee.org/Opinions.aspx
(last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (“Article VII, Section 13, of the Cherokee Nation Constitution
states: There shall be created an office of the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall
be a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, admitted to practice law before the highest court of any
state of the United States. The Attorney General shall represent the Nation in all criminal
cases in the courts of the Nation, and in all civil actions wherein the Cherokee Nation is
named as a party, and shall have such other duties as the Council may prescribe by law. The
Attorney General shall be appointed by the Principal Chief and confirmed by the Council for
a term of five (5) years. The Attorney General shall be authorized to designate such
prosecutors and other assistants as deemed necessary to carry out the duties of office, and
may only be removed from office in conformance with Article XI of the Cherokee Nation
Constitution.”).
18. See, e.g., Rob Roy Smith, The Council’s Counsel: The Ethics of Representing Tribal
Councils, MORRISSET, SCHLOSSER, JOZWIAK, & SOMERVILLE (July 2006), http://www.msaj
.com/ISB%20CLE%20July2006_06.htm.
19. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 72 (2009).
20. Compare In re the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A-CV-41-92 (Navajo May
17, 1993), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/NNBARulesConduct.htm#A-CV-41-92
(adopting ABA Model Rules with amendments, additions, and exceptions), with In re the
Adoption of Rules for Attorneys, Application to Bar, Discipline, and Oath, No. JAT AD-9901 (Cherokee Jan. 29, 1999), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org/Portals/73/
Documents/CNBA/JAT-AD-99-01.pdf (adopting the State of Oklahoma’s Rules of
Professional Conduct as a “minimum standard” of conduct for lawyers admitted to practice
before the Cherokee courts but noting that if there is a conflict between the Oklahoma
courts’ interpretation of those rules and the Cherokee courts’ interpretation, “the Cherokee
law shall prevail”).
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culture.21 During various periods of federal Indian policy, the injection of
Anglo-American law into tribal communities has been an explicit tool of
government “assimilation” programs designed to eradicate tribal cultures
and governing structures.22 For all of these reasons, the Rules’ reference to
the lawyer as an “officer of the legal system” may render the lawyer an
outsider or even a threat to the tribal existence and raises questions about
the lawyer’s accountability to the client community.23
Yet, in today’s period of tribal “self-determination,” in which tribal
people are revitalizing and decolonizing all aspects of their governments
and institutions, the position and responsibilities of the tribal lawyer have
also begun to change. Tribal lawyers are now called on to assist with not
only treaty rights litigation but also negotiating the contours of governmentto-government relationships with states and the federal government;
economic development and financial matters; the process of internal legal
reform, including the revision of tribal codes and constitutions, and the
rebuilding of tribal dispute resolution institutions; and even human rights
advocacy in international forums.
Through these activities, which
constitute the “decolonization” of federal Indian law and the
“revitalization” of Indian communities, tribes are identifying the core
competencies and values they seek in legal representation and taking the
initiative to license and hire attorneys who meet those standards.24 At this
transformative time, a rich understanding of the role of tribal lawyers is
very much needed.
In fact, many of the challenges faced by tribal lawyers in daily practice
may not be addressed by the Rules. Pursuant to Rule 1.13, for example, a
tribal lawyer is expected to represent her client and, in this case, “the client
of the tribal attorney is the entire tribe, not its individual members”25—a
prescription that flows directly from the entity model described above. Yet,
tribes have multivalent goals and interrelated constituencies that may
transcend a model based on corporate clients. As a practical matter, for
example, the attorney may report to the tribe’s executive or legislative
branch, but sometimes individual tribal members may believe that the tribal
attorney should represent them. While this problem is often resolved by
21. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
22. See, e.g., JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
IN HOPI TRIBAL COURT 8–21 (2008) (describing the history of federal Courts of Indian
Offenses as instruments of federal control over Indian behavior, and challenging the legacy
concerned with the contemporary attempt to transform these courts into tribal justice
systems).
23. See CANBY, supra note 19, at 73 (“Because the tribal attorneys are often not tribal
members or even Indians, they must to some degree be considered an outside influence
affecting tribal self-government.”).
24. See, e.g., RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A
TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 32 (2009) (describing the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court’s authority over the Navajo Bar Association, an organization that licenses attorneys
and lay advocates who practice law in the Navajo Nation).
25. See CANBY, supra note 19, at 69.
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explanation of the client identity or referral to other counsel, sometimes it is
more fraught. The tribal attorney may be the only attorney located on or
near the reservation community. In some tribes, subgroups of tribal
members may claim to represent the tribe in some capacity; indeed, the
government recognized by the United States may operate alongside a
traditional leadership structure in which clan mothers, village leaders, or
religious priests have a role in decision making.26 Moreover, for decades,
tribes could only hire lawyers through contracts approved by the United
States—even in cases against the United States—creating conflicts of
interest endemic to the relationship. In these cases, the Rules’ simplistic
answer to the question of “whom does the attorney represent” does not
always provide sufficient guidance to the complicated issues faced by the
tribal attorney.
Thus tribal lawyers face questions about whom or what entity or
constituencies they represent. And these are not the only questions that
arise in the context of tribal lawyering. How are concepts of loyalty,
liability, fairness, and confidentiality construed in the particular tribal
culture?27 How should tribal lawyers balance their obligation to limit the
tribe’s liability (for example, by defending the tribe’s inherent sovereign
immunity) with the commercial demands of financial investors and civil
rights claims of tribal citizens? How should a particular tribal client’s
interests be construed against the situation of Indian tribes across the United
States? How should the tribal attorney envision her role against the
backdrop and structure of federal Indian law that makes tribes both
extraconstitutional entities and critical players in the experiments of
American conquest and colonialism, democracy, and pluralism?28
While some of these questions are particular to the experience of Indian
tribes as extraconstitutional entities maintaining indigenous cultures against
a history of colonization, others illustrate broader tensions in group
lawyering, in which the existing model’s individualistic approach fails to
capture the challenges of group representation. Scholars have long noted
shortcomings in the model of “corporate” representation, which, following
26. See, e.g., Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1998)
(describing a challenge to the federal government’s recognition of a tribal representative
over the objection of other community members with traditional authority); Poodry v.
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 877 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing traditional
and newer forms of governance operating among Seneca communities).
27. See Navajo Nation v. Crockett, 7 Navajo Rptr. 237 (1996) (stating that an employee
with a grievance should “talk things out” with supervisors before turning to external
channels of review and coercive redress).
28. See generally Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 436 (2005) (“[T]he more fundamental problem [of federal
Indian law] is that, without an interrogation of the immense normative problems of a
constitutional system created by colonialism, the answers generated by the [Supreme] Court
are doomed to reflect a ruthless pragmatism consistent with even the modest respect for
tribal prerogatives that traditional federal Indian law sometimes reflected in appreciation of
our colonial past. At bottom, we have every right to be confused about both the internal
incoherence of Indian law and the asymmetry between that body of doctrine and its external
analogs.”).
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Rule 1.13, focuses on hierarchical decision-making processes and declares a
lawyer’s allegiance to the interests of the entity defined to be the interest of
its shareholders only to yield in reality to the authority and interests of the
executives who hire and fire lawyers.29
Even more troubling, the individualistic nature of the basic model of
lawyering casts a long shadow on emerging alternative models of group
representation. The model of the “government lawyer” serving a singular
entity, for example, belies many other possible ways to envision the “client”
of the government attorney, including (1) the public interest; (2) the
government as a whole; (3) the branch of government in which the lawyer
is employed (e.g., executive, legislative, or judicial); (4) the particular
agency or department in which the lawyer works; and (5) the responsible
officers who make decisions for the agency.30
Similarly, “cause lawyering,” in which the group is conceived in terms of
a particular normative position, can be challenging because it requires
assessing the cause and ascertaining who speaks for it—moves that may or
may not account for group dynamics and values.31 Lawyering for
“minorities”—typically seeking civil rights for groups subordinated by race,
gender, class, religion, sexual orientation, or other status—may struggle to
appreciate and give voice to the varied experiences, values, identities, and
beliefs of group members.32
In many settings, the instruction that the lawyer must serve her client in
the traditional model fails to answer some of the difficult questions.
Instead, it serves to only start a conversation: for purposes of the clientattorney representation, who and what is the client? What does it mean to
represent a group of individuals, interests, and values? What does it mean
to be a group lawyer? On these questions, the Rules are often silent.
Usually, when they are, the theoretical literature exploring theories of law
practice, professional ideology, and role morality can be of use to practicing
lawyers in providing a context against which to assess their professional
conduct, duties under the Rules, and role obligations as well as necessary
guidance regarding the exercise of professional judgment.33 But to the
extent that these theories are still grounded in the paradigm of the
individual lawyer representing an individual client, they fail to illuminate
29. See infra Part IV.A–B.
30. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 796, 797 n.41 (2000)
(citing Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer As Whistleblower: Confidentiality and Government
Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991)).
31. See, e.g., ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 279–90 (2013).
32. See GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 24 (1992) (critiquing a particular approach to cause lawyering
as “regnant lawyering” and preferring, instead, a model of community lawyering, especially
in low-income communities); KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 4 (2012) (challenging the conventional view that the civil
rights lawyers of the 1960’s represented a “unified minority group”).
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012).
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key questions in group lawyering, such as the many questions that confront
lawyers for Indian tribes.
Put differently, we argue that lawyering for groups is not only a practice
without a theory, but to some extent, a practice not knowing it lacks a
theory. Indeed, we assert that in purporting to apply to all lawyers—group
lawyers included—the dominant Standard Conception obscures the need to
develop a theory of law practice and rules of conduct that fit lawyering for
groups. Ultimately then, perhaps lawyering for groups can be better
described not as a practice without a theory, but rather as practice stuck
with an ill-fitting yet powerful theory that would benefit from additional
reflection, including consideration of alternatives that have begun to emerge
both in practice and in the literature.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAWYERING
This part provides a historical overview of American Indian experiences
with lawyers, with two aims in mind: first, to introduce some of the
foundational rules and structures of Indian law, and second, to highlight the
role of lawyers in developing the field. While this history is deep and
broad, we do not aim to provide exhaustive treatment, but rather to
highlight key moments with relevance for our later discussion of
contemporary American Indian tribal lawyering.
A. Origins
Traditionally, Indian tribes had leaders and representatives for internal
and external matters.34 As Matthew Fletcher writes about early Anishinabe
communities, each band or group of families was represented by an ogemuk
whose authority derived from success at activities such as warfare, hunting,
or singing, and who secured their power through service to the
community.35 In other instances, leadership may have been inherited
among certain lineages, societies, or families.36 In many tribes, leaders
with skills of oratory, knowledge of tribal law, and other indicia of
community legitimacy were charged with representing the town, village,
34. While most tribes had terms for “leader,” it is less clear that they had “lawyers.” An
interesting project would be to assess how various tribes describe lawyers in their own
languages. In the Cherokee language, the noun for “lawyer” is “ditiyohihi,” a word that is
related to the verb “atiyohiha” or “he is arguing.” DURBIN FEELING, CHEROKEE-ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 59, 207 (1975); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Dibakonigowin: Indian
Lawyer As Abductee, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 209, 209 n.1 (2006) (noting that in the
Ojibway language “dibakonigowin” means “[j]udgment undergone or received”).
35. See FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 14–15 (citing Benjamin Ramirez-Shkwegnaabi, The
Dynamics of American Indian Diplomacy in the Great Lakes Region, 27 AM. INDIAN
CULTURE & RES. J. 53 (2003)).
36. See, e.g., GELYA FRANK & CAROLE GOLDBERG, DEFYING THE ODDS: THE TULE RIVER
TRIBE’S STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY IN THREE CENTURIES (2010) (describing that the
leadership of the Yokuts—ancestors of the contemporary Tule River Indian Tribe—
descended from the Eagle lineage, consistent with the role of the eagle in the tribal creation
story).
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band, or tribe in external relations. Leaders represented their communities
in intertribal diplomacy, and negotiations concerning land, hunting, trade,
war, religion, and other matters often commemorated in agreements and
treaties among tribes. As with religion, subsistence practices, and social
organization, leadership in many tribes was geared toward maintaining
relationships among community members, observing the relationship
between human beings and the natural world, and other activities geared
toward the collective well-being and survival of the tribe.37
It was these traditional tribal leaders, sometimes with the assistance of
translators, who usually represented tribes in their seventeenth to nineteenth
century treaty negotiations with European nations, colonial governments, or
the United States.38 And while tribes do not appear to have been formally
represented by legal counsel in most treaty negotiations, they often
negotiated quite successfully to retain key property and sovereignty rights,
as well as obligations of protection from the United States. Yet it is also
true that the treaty process was fraught with linguistic and cultural
misunderstandings, as well as fraud and coercive practices by federal
agents.39 Notwithstanding these complicated origins, the resulting treaties
were (usually) ratified by Congress, forming the basis for the legal
relationship between tribes and the United States and becoming the
“supreme Law of the Land.”40
B. Power and the Legal System
When it came time to litigate Indian treaties in court, tribes were
represented by counsel in cases that are also fraught with complex legacies
and interpretations. In the famous case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia41 in
1831, for example, the Cherokees engaged former U.S. Attorney General
William Wirt to sue to enjoin Georgia from extending its laws over the
Cherokee Nation, based on its claim that the state’s activity violated the
Treaty of Hopewell (1785) and the Treaty of Holston (1791) between the
37. For accounts of tribal norms and cultures, see, for example, Amy Bowers & Kristen
A. Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of Conquest: The Story of Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, in INDIAN LAW STORIES (Carole Goldberg, Kevin
K. Washburn, Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011) (describing the Yurok, Tolowa, and Karuk
tribes); WILMA MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER: A CHIEF AND HER PEOPLE 16–
30 (1999) (describing Cherokee origins and traditions); CHARLES WILKINSON, THE PEOPLE
ARE DANCING AGAIN: THE HISTORY OF THE SILETZ TRIBE OF WESTERN WASHINGTON 11–53
(2010) (describing the Siletz tribes).
38. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 17–27, 44–51, 61–69 (describing the role of
ogemuk in the Treaties of 1835 and 1855).
39. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER
ON THE FRONTIER 49–84 (2005) (discussing language and cultural differences, questions of
authority and land value, use of liquor, forgery, and fraud as factors affecting the legitimacy
of land sales by Indian nations to colonial governments and settlers). For additional
background on the federal-tribal treaty relationship, see generally VINE DELORIA JR., BEHIND
THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1974).
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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Cherokee Nation and the United States.42 The Cherokee Nation lawsuit
occurred during a period of violence and instability when Georgia’s citizens
were increasingly threatening Cherokee life, liberty, and property. The
Court dismissed Cherokee Nation for lack of original jurisdiction, on
grounds that the Cherokee Nation was not a “foreign state” entitled to sue
Georgia pursuant to Article III.43 In 1832, the Cherokee Nation enlisted
Wirt to raise the treaty claims again, this time in a defense of two Christian
missionaries who had been arrested within the boundaries of the Cherokee
Nation by Georgia authorities. Wirt won the second case, with Chief
Justice Marshall holding in Worcester v. Georgia44 that, as a matter of
federal law, including the treaties, Cherokee Nation was an independent
territory in which the laws of the state of Georgia could have no force.45
Despite the holding in Worcester, politics quickly intervened, with
President Andrew Jackson, Georgia, and white citizens all refusing to bend
to the Supreme Court’s authority.46 In 1835, the United States induced a
faction of Cherokees, opposing the elected Principle Chief and most
Cherokee people, to sign the Treaty of New Echota ceding all of their
eastern lands in exchange for new lands in Indian Territory (present-day
Oklahoma).47 The majority of Cherokees continued to resist, but after
losing property to local militias and then being physically corralled into
federal stockades, the Cherokees were relocated to Indian Territory via the
Trail of Tears, a devastating experience during which 4,000 people, or
approximately one-quarter of the population, died.48
As the Cherokee cases begin to suggest, the relationship between Indian
tribes and their lawyers has long implicated issues of the greatest
magnitude. By most accounts, the Cherokees had an excellent lawyer in
these cases.49 Additionally, as described in greater detail below, the
Cherokee leaders went into the litigation with their eyes wide open about
the strategy, believing that an appeal to the courts was the best remaining
chance of preserving the Cherokee Nation, particularly after having already
petitioned the executive and legislative branches for relief. Moreover, Wirt
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
45. Id.
46. See Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Sovereignty: The Story of the
Cherokee Cases, in INDIAN LAW STORIES, supra note 37.
47. See id. at 77–78.
48. These figures are somewhat contested, with “population lost” estimates as low as
2,000 and as high as 10,000, depending on the methodology. For discussion, see CHARLES
C. ROYCE, THE CHEROKEE NATION OF INDIANS 170–78 (1975); RUSSELL THORNTON, THE
CHEROKEES: A POPULATION HISTORY 74 (1990).
49. Compare Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 2010 Dillon Lecture: Rebooting Indian Law in
the Supreme Court, 55 S.D. L. REV. 510, 518 (2010) (describing Wirt as “one of the most
influential, well-known, and successful appellate advocates in the nation”), with Carey N.
Vicenti, The Social Structures of Legal Neocolonialism in Native America, 10 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 513, 518 (2001) (“It should be noted, though, that the Cherokee Nation relied for
legal advice upon persons who were not members of the nation, nor sworn to any allegiance
to the nation.”).
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did convince the Supreme Court to strike down Georgia laws threatening
the political autonomy of the Cherokee Nation. From a federal common
law perspective, Cherokee Nation and Worcester are arguably good
precedents, establishing the status of tribes as “domestic dependent nations”
subject to the authority and protection of the United States, with reserved
rights of sovereignty and property. These holdings constitute some of the
“foundational principles” of federal Indian law, which leading scholars have
described as protecting the tribal existence.50
Yet, as a practical matter for the Cherokees, even the best legal advocacy
did not protect them from horrific losses of life, homeland, and culture
during the Trail of Tears, or the intergenerational harms that ensued.51
Additionally, some critics charge that by filing the case in the “courts of the
conqueror,” Wirt fatally compromised his clients’ position—and indeed the
legal position of all Indian tribes to follow.52 Why should tribes, whose
existence predated the Constitution and who did not consent to the
constitutional compact, recognize the power of the Supreme Court at all?
After Wirt filed these cases, these questions became largely moot and the
language of Cherokee Nation and Worcester, based in significant part on
nineteenth century notions of Indian racial inferiority, now defines the legal
status of all 500-plus tribes in the United States.53 Viewing the Supreme
Court’s early Indian jurisprudence in this light, certain critics characterize
the Cherokee cases, along with the 1823 case of Johnson v. McIntosh, as
judicial attempts to “legitimize” American Indian conquest, against all
moral and legal instincts to the contrary.54
Given that these early cases still form the foundational principles of
federal Indian law, any account of the relationship between tribes and their
lawyers must acknowledge the highly charged nature of this history. From
the beginning, lawyers have played a powerful role in American Indian life
and even the most valiant efforts to advocate for tribes in the U.S. legal
50. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (1996).
51. See Chadwick Smith & Faye Teague, The Response of the Cherokee Nation to the
Cherokee Outlet Centennial Celebration: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 29 TULSA L.J.
263, 266 (1993) (“For the majority of Cherokees, the Trail of Tears is still an open wound.”).
52. See Vicenti, supra note 49, at 518.
53. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT,
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 47–70 (2005) (identifying
Marshall’s overt appeal to Indians’ alleged racial inferiority as a basis for federal supremacy
in Indian affairs).
54. See, e.g., id. 78–79, 112. The Cherokee cases are the final two in what is known as
the “Marshall Trilogy” in which the Chief Justice announced what came to be the
foundational principles of federal Indian law. The first of these, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), has also been roundly criticized. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note
21, at 316–17 (“Johnson’s acceptance of the Doctrine of Discovery into United States law
preserved the legacy of 1,000 years of European racism and colonialism directed against
non-Western peoples. . . . While the tasks of conquest and colonization had not yet been
fully actualized on the entire American continent, the ordinary legal rules and principles of
federal Indian law set down by Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh and its discourse of
conquest ensures that future acts of genocide would proceed on a rationalized, legal basis.”).
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system may be perceived alternatively as courageous acts of legal
resistance, insidious compliance with the colonial project, or something in
between.
C. Loyalty and Conflicts
After the foundational cases, the relationship between tribes and their
lawyers only became even more fraught with ethical and professional
issues. In 1871, Congress not only ended treaty-making with tribes but also
passed legislation requiring tribes to obtain federal approval before they
could engage attorneys, even in suits against the United States.55
Ostensibly passed to protect tribal leaders from unscrupulous professionals,
this statute often delayed, impeded, and compromised Indians’ access to
legal services into the contemporary era.56
Yet individuals, including several early American Indian lawyers,
maneuvered around bureaucratic limitations to represent tribes.57 Perhaps
the first Indian woman admitted to practice law, Lyda Burton Conley, was a
Wyandotte Indian born in 1869 near present-day Kansas City.58 She
enrolled at the Kansas City School of Law, graduated, and was admitted to
the Missouri State Bar in 1902. Foreshadowing the experience of many
American Indian lawyers to follow, Conley’s professional work took on a
very personal dimension. Despite treaty provisions to the contrary, the
federal government announced in 1906 that it would lift trust restrictions on
55. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 81 (2006)) (requiring approval by the Secretary of the Interior on contracts between
any person and any Indian tribe or individual Indian for the payment of money or thing of
value). Congress later confirmed the requirement for secretarial approval of attorney
contracts in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 16, 48 Stat. 984,
987 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2006)). Congress finally repealed the
Secretary’s approval authority over attorney contracts, with certain exceptions, via the Indian
Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-179,
114 Stat. 46. Thus it was not until 2000 that most tribes could hire an attorney without
approval of the United States.
56. In one telling story, tribal attorney Ken Bellmard describes that when he tried to
represent the Tonkawa Tribe in claims that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had interfered
with tribal elections, he had to get the same BIA to approve his attorney contract. See, e.g.,
Ken Bellmard, Endeavoring To Persevere: Becoming and Being a Tribal Attorney, 9 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 752, 756 (2000) (“During our ongoing disputes with the BIA, it took
approximately one year for the local agency office to approve my contract with the Tonkawa
Tribe, whereas the individual acting as attorney for the [the political faction allegedly
favored by the BIA] was approved by the BIA in a week or less.”).
57. There is great debate and interest in the question of who was the “first” American
Indian attorney. Of course this question is complicated by the fact that in early American
history, individuals could read for the bar without being formally admitted to practice. For
some early candidates, see Rennard Strickland, Yellow Bird’s Song: The Message of
America’s First Native American Attorney, 29 TULSA L.J. 247, 247 (1994) (identifying
Cherokee John Rollin Ridge, 1827–1867, as the first American Indian attorney). See also
The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616, 616 (1870) (in which Cherokee E.C. Boudinot
may have been both a party and attorney).
58. See Stacy L. Leeds & Elizabeth Mashie Gunsaulis, Resistance, Resilience, and
Reconciliation: Reflections on Native American Women and the Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 303, 307–17 (2012).
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Wyandotte land and permit the sale of the tribal cemetery to developers.59
Conley’s mother and grandmother, as well as many others were buried in
the tribal cemetery, prompting Conley and her sisters to take their shotguns
and protect the graves around the clock. After numerous trips to jail,
Conley decided to try another model of advocacy. Taking the case all the
way to the Supreme Court, Conley argued in Conley v. Ballenger60 that the
Secretary of the Interior should be enjoined from selling an Indian burial
ground.61 Although the Supreme Court rejected her claim, Conley’s
passionate advocacy attracted then-Senator (and later Vice President)
Charles Curtis, a Kaw tribal descendant, to visit the cemetery and introduce
legislation to protect it from development.62
The Wyandotte case ultimately served as the antecedent for the
movement to protect American Indian gravesites, and Conley has become a
hero to contemporary women. Yet, the Wyandottes’ situation was also
exceptional, as very few tribes in the early 1900s were fortunate enough to
have a tribal member, trained as a lawyer, who could stand up so effectively
for tribal rights to property and culture. This was the “assimilation” era in
which the official federal policy was to eradicate tribes, convert Indians to
Christianity, replace subsistence lifestyles with farming, break up
reservations, and force Indians to enter mainstream society as taxpaying
individuals rather than as members of Indian tribes.
More typical, and ultimately emblematic, of tribal legal experiences
during the assimilation era was the case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,63 in
which the Kiowa Tribe lost its challenge to the government’s allotment of
2.5 million acres of tribal lands.64 In Lone Wolf, the Kiowas argued that the
“Jerome Agreement,” in which the government had coerced or forged tribal
consent to the allotment (and obtaining less than the number of signatures
required by treaty), violated their Fifth Amendment rights to property.65
The Kiowas, like the Cherokees before them, hired a lawyer with a
tremendous amount of experience, former U.S. Congressman and federal
judge William M. Springer—whose fees were paid both by the Indian
Rights Association and by Texas cattlemen who were leasing Kiowa
59. Treaty with the Wyandotte, U.S.-Wyandot, Jan. 31, 1855, 10 Stat 1159.
60. 216 U.S. 84 (1910). The case was styled Conley v. Ballenger because the Supreme
Court would not admit Conley to practice, forcing her to become a named plaintiff and make
the oral argument pro se. Conley could not find an attorney who would move for her
admission to the Court. See Kim Dayton, Trespassers, Beware!: Lyda Burton Conley and
the Battle for Huron Place Cemetery, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 23–27 (1996).
61. See Conley, 216 U.S. at 88.
62. See Dayton, supra note 60, at 26–27.
63. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
64. Id. at 568 (upholding the power of Congress to abrogate a treaty and allot the lands
of Kiowa tribe).
65. The Jerome Commission, staffed in part by lawyers, was the government agency
responsible for negotiating allotment agreements with tribes, though as scholars have noted,
the Commission often used coercive tactics. See WILLIAM HAGAN, TAKING INDIAN LANDS:
THE CHEROKEE (JEROME) COMMISSION 1889–93, at 236–37 (2003) (describing these tactics
as applied to the Cherokee Nation).
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lands.66 In a case that has been forever vilified since, the Supreme Court
held in Lone Wolf that Congress was perfectly free to abrogate the tribe’s
treaty rights and distribute the reservation lands to individual Indians,
selling off the “surplus” to white citizens.67 Lone Wolf came to stand for
the most expansive formulation of the government’s “plenary power” over
Indians, and the early 1900s were generally regarded as the low point of
tribal well-being on every social, economic, and cultural measure.
Eventually, Congress repudiated the allotment and assimilation policy
with another act that also had ramifications for legal representation. In
1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) to confirm the
ongoing existence of tribes and encourage them to form constitutional-style
governments.68 Of course, some tribes had retained their own traditional
governance and others rejected the IRA outright. Still, with model
constitutions and informational memoranda distributed by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) and active federal involvement in the drafting and
approval process, hundreds of tribes did adopt IRA constitutions, and these
documents did not always reflect traditional forms of tribal leadership or
The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
culture.69
Development (HPAIED) has argued that many IRA constitutions were both
difficult to administer and mismatched with tribal values. As HPAIED
scholar Manley Begay has written, for example, the Crow Tribe “operated
under a constitution drafted with significant non-Native legal advice” that
“not only produced an enormous, unwieldy legislature, but . . . paid no
respect to a nation traditionally governed by strong clans . . . and
hierarchies of chiefs.”70
Once in place, however, IRA governments became the entities
empowered (with federal permission) to hire lawyers, even if these
governments did not necessarily reflect the will of the people. As Charles
Wilkinson has written evocatively about the Hopi tribe, for example, the
lawyer who represented the IRA tribal government negotiating a major
lease for coal mining on tribal lands in the 1960s was almost certainly not
66. See Angela R. Riley, The Apex of Congress’ Plenary Power over Indian Affairs:
The Story of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, in INDIAN LAW STORIES, supra note 37, at 208. We do
not mean here to suggest that Springer’s quality of representation was tainted by a conflict of
interest, but rather to challenge and contextualize the conceptions of lawyers’ loyalty and
allegiance to group clients.
67. Id. at 223.
68. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)).
69. There is a good bit of discussion in the literature about the extent to which the
federal government was involved in the drafting and adoption of these constitutions. FELIX S.
COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS xvi–xxix (David E. Wilkins ed., 2006)
(Cohen was “opposed to the idea of sending out canned constitutions” to tribes and he made
clear his view “that constitutions must be worked out in the first place by the Indians in the
field.”).
70. See Manley A. Begay et al., Development, Governance, Culture: What Are They
and What Do They Have To Do with Rebuilding Native Nations?, in REBUILDING NATIVE
NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 34, 51 (Miriam Jorgensen ed.,
2007).
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representing in any meaningful way the traditional village and clan leaders
for whom the deal was a cultural anathema.71 And of course it did not help
that the Hopis’ lawyer was suspected of representing the coal company at
the same time.72 Yet the Crow and Hopi tribal lawyers, and others during
the IRA period, had enormous power, both structural and personal, over the
tribes they represented.
While Indian tribes had long been pressing treaty claims, the Indian
Claims Commission Act of 194673 gave them a new platform from which to
do so, and the ensuing claims process became a major source of business
for lawyers. Like many major events in federal Indian law, the creation of
the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) reflected complicated federal
motives, with mixed results for the tribes.74 On the one hand, federal
lawmakers sought to provide a venue for the redress of longstanding Indian
claims that had otherwise defied legal resolution, a development that many
Indians and their supporters viewed favorably.75 Lawyers engaged by
tribes devoted themselves, sometimes heroically, to building massive
records, complete with historical, geographic, and ethnographic testimony,
in support of multiyear and even multidecade Indian land claims, and
sometimes they won large awards.76
On the other hand, the ICC was formed at the beginning of the
“termination” era when Congress would increasingly seek to end the special
relationship with tribes, sell off tribal lands and resources, and integrate
individuals into mainstream society.77 To those ends, the determination to
resolve outstanding Indian treaty claims was part of the government’s larger
objective to get out of the Indian business, notwithstanding its many
promises to the tribes and their ongoing needs. Moreover, there were major
misunderstandings that plagued the ICC litigation: in some cases, the
Indian tribal leaders believed that they were seeking actual restitution of the
lands, all while their lawyers were filing claims for monetary remedies, of
which the lawyers could collect up to 10 percent in contingency fees.78 On
71. See CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 105–23, 276–313 (1999) (discussing the role of the long-time Hopi
general counsel in representing the tribe in coal mining matters vis-à-vis Peabody Coal and
the Navajo Nation).
72. See id. But see United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 513–14 (2003)
(denying Navajo Nation’s breach of trust claim in a case where the Interior officials’ ex parte
communications with Peabody Coal led to approval of a coal mining lease at rate of 12.5
percent instead of 20 percent, for a loss of $600 million to the tribe).
73. See Act of Aug. 8, 1946, ch. 907, 60 Stat. 939 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1a (2006)).
74. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian
Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453, 468–71 (1994). See generally Nell
Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992)
(reviewing a number of ICC cases).
75. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 1.06.
76. See CHRISTIAN W. MCMILLEN, MAKING INDIAN LAW: THE HUALAPAI LAND CASE
AND THE BIRTH OF ETHNOHISTORY 166–83 (2007).
77. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 1.06.
78. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Indian Claims Commission, in INDIAN SELF-RULE
151–55 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986); see also Traci N. Zlock, Note, The Native American
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this point, most commentators agree the ICC narrowly construed its
authority to award equitable remedies, preferring instead monetary awards
that were often unsatisfying to the tribes.79 In one infamous case, the
Supreme Court upheld a $106 million award to the Sioux Nation for the
taking of the Black Hills, but the Sioux people refused to accept any money
for their sacred lands.80 The non-Indian lawyers collected $10,595,943,
while the Indians continue—to this day—to live in poverty and seek the
return of their land.81 In another case, a band of Western Shoshone claimed
that the lawyer alleging to represent them had not been so authorized,82 and
in still another, a tribe claimed that the lawyers had stipulated to reservation
boundaries excluding lands on which tribal members were then living.83
The courts upheld the judgments in these cases over the tribes’ objections
about their lawyers. In short, the ICC period brought many lawyers into the
practice of Indian law, with great potential to remedy historic wrongs, but
left a legacy of Indian disappointment in, and in some cases contempt for,
the legal profession.84
D. Legal and Political Empowerment
Finally, after decades of shifting federal Indian policy reflected in the
discussion above, a sea change occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, ultimately
leading to the tribal “self-determination” era. As part of the war on poverty
launched in the mid-1960s under the Office of Economic Opportunity,
federally funded legal services programs were established around the
country to provide legal services to poor and disadvantaged people.85
Many of these programs were located on or near Indian reservations and
Tribe As a Client: An Ethical Analysis, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 159, 160 (1996) (stating
that “[a]lmost ten percent of the tribes who successfully litigated claims pursuant to the
ICCA refused to accept their monetary awards despite the abject state of poverty in which
they often lived”).
79. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 269
(6th ed. 2011).
80. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
81. See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION VERSUS
THE UNITED STATES 1775 TO THE PRESENT 403–28 (1991); see also Kirsten Matoy Carlson,
Priceless Property, GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2–3), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030248 (noting that even though the
Treasury Department account in which the Sioux Nation award was deposited now holds
over a billion dollars, the Sioux tribes refuse distribution because “money—even $1.3 billion
dollars—could not compensate them for the taking of their beloved Black Hills”).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 41–45 (1985) (holding that Western
Shoshone had been compensated for their land even though they refused to cooperate in
distribution of the funds).
83. See, e.g., Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States, 647 F.2d 1087 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(holding that the tribe’s request to withdraw from a 1969 stipulation made by its attorney
without its permission was untimely).
84. See Vicenti, supra note 49, at 527; see also E. Richard Hart, The Indian Claims
Commission, in INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra note 78, at 156–58 (describing the problems of
legal representation in other Indian Claims Commission cases).
85. See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS
191–98 (2005).
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helped tribes develop infrastructure and obtain legal representation in key
cases.86 California Indian Legal Services was founded in 1967 to represent
tribes and individual Indians who had long been denied any legal rights or
recognition in California or nationally.87 In Washington, D.C., the National
Congress of American Indians presented a collective voice in national
Indian politics, and leaders such as the Standing Rock Sioux tribal member
Vine Deloria, who graduated from law school in 1970, articulated the case
for American Indian self-government.88 Through these and other vehicles,
American Indians made clear that they were here to stay and newly inspired
to assert their collective and individual rights.
Eventually, the United States realized that it could no longer keep trying
to “end the Indian problem.”89 In 1970, President Richard Nixon
announced the birth of a new policy of “self-determination” that would
respect tribal autonomy in governance, education, economic development,
and culture, while maintaining historic federal obligations to support all of
these initiatives. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Act was
passed in 1974 and followed by dozens of statutes promoting the goals that
Nixon had announced.90 At the same time, tribes experienced victories in
major court cases, including the recognition of off-reservation fishing rights
in United States v. Washington, with the capacity to restore tribal
subsistence practices.91 The tribes in Washington were represented by lead
counsel David Getches of the new Native American Rights Fund (NARF),
established in 1969 with funding from the Ford Foundation, to improve
representation for Indian tribes.92 From its inception, NARF devoted itself
to providing the best legal representation for tribes, a concept that would
soon include American Indian leadership of the organization. In 1973,
Getches relinquished the NARF directorship to John Echohawk, a Pawnee
Indian who had graduated from the University of New Mexico Law School,
and who would develop NARF into the nation’s preeminent public interest
firm advocating for Indian tribes. As Echohawk later recounted, suggesting
a dynamic of empowerment in tribal advocacy, “There were not very many
Native American attorneys around in those days but [Getches] understood
the importance of Native American leadership in the organization. He was
my mentor and supported me in becoming the Executive Director in
1973.”93 Along with many dedicated non-Indian lawyers, American Indian
86. See, e.g., Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 37, at 489, 503–07 (on the role of povertyprevention programs and legal services organizations in the revitalization of the Yurok,
Karuk, and Tolowa tribes and their legal strategies in the 1960s and 1970s).
87. See CILS History, CAL. INDIAN LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.calindian.org/about/
cils-history (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
88. See WILKINSON, supra note 85, at 102–12.
89. See RED POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIANS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM (Alvin Josephy, Jr. et
al. eds., 1971).
90. See Indian Self Determination & Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2006).
91. United States v. Washington, 66 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
92. See NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND, http://www.narf.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
93. John Echohawk, Remarks at the David H. Getches Memorial (Aug. 11, 2011),
available at http://dirwww.colorado.edu/law/faculty/getches/speeches/echohawkjohn.pdf.
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lawyers brought their experience, energy, and empathy to major cases in
Indian law. One of the first Indian women attorneys at NARF, the PoncaCreek lawyer Yvonne Knight, explained, “When you go out there to
represent Indian people, you see your family, your brothers, your sisters,
your nephews, your mother and father, your grandparents. You realize the
devastating impact that society can have on people because they are a
different culture, because their skin is a different color.”94
Things were clearly changing in the legal representation of tribes by the
1970s. In 1978, the Indian Law Resource Center (ILRC) was established
by Tim Coulter of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation, to advocate for
indigenous peoples in both domestic and international forums.95 Even more
broadly, tribal members, in partnership with non-Indian allies, were taking
the lead in Indian law matters. Indeed, an explosion in tribal lawyering
went hand-in-hand with the self-determination era.96 As tribes reasserted
treaty rights and tested the bounds of tribal sovereignty, they needed
litigators. As they became more involved in business transactions,
especially gaming and complex financing, they needed commercial lawyers.
As they pressed for legislative solutions to policy problems, they needed
lobbyists. As they developed legal departments, court systems, and
legislative-regulatory infrastructure, they needed government lawyers. As
they began to engage in the international human rights system, they needed
advocates at the United Nations, Organization of American States, and so
on.
For many of the same reasons of empowerment and opportunity, more
and more American Indians started going to college and law school during
the self-determination era. The American Indian Law Center at the
University of New Mexico, first under the leadership of Fred Hart and Tom
Christopher, and later Philip “Sam” Deloria, launched a program to recruit
and prepare American Indians for law school, providing rigorous training
and a pipeline for American Indians in the profession.97 As a result of
student advocacy, universities around the country, including Harvard,
which was originally chartered to educate both “English” and Indian youth,
were recognizing an obligation to recruit Indian students and teach Indian
law.98 At law schools, professors from both the academy and practice
94. See Modern Day Warrior: NARF Attorney Yvonne Knight Retires, NATIVE AM. RTS.
FUND (Oct. 26, 2007), http://narfnews.blogspot.com/2007/10/modern-day-warrior-narfattorney-yvonne.html.
95. See Message from the Executive Director, INDIAN L. RESOURCE CENTER,
http://www.indianlaw.org/about/executive (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
96. See Lewis Kamb, As Tribes Prosper, They Need Lawyers, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (Oct. 13, 2003), http://seattlepi.com/local/article/as-tribes-prosper-they-needlawyers-1126827.php.
97. See Our History, AM. INDIAN L. CENTER, INC., http://www.ailc-inc.org/History.htm
(last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
98. See, e.g., Brief History of HUNAP, HARV. U. NATIVE AM. PROGRAM, http://www
.hunap.harvard.edu/about-hunap/welcome (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (“The education of
Native Americans is woven into the long history of Harvard University. The Charter of
1650, by which Harvard University continues to be governed, pledges the University to “the
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including Rennard Strickland, Ralph Johnson, Monroe Price, Reid
Chambers, and many others were developing federal Indian Law into a
discrete field of study attracting both Indian and non-Indian students who
intended to practice in the field.99
From 1988 to 2001, thirteen members or descendants of tribes, namely
S. James Anaya, Raymond Cross, Heather Kendall-Miller, Rodney Lewis,
Arlinda Locklear, Melody McCoy, Marilyn Miles, Terry Pechota,
G. William Rice, Martin Seneca, Dale White, Jeanne Whiteing, and Susan
Williams, appeared as counsel for tribal interests before the Supreme Court
in major American Indian cases that determined tribal rights in tax, water,
property, religion, jurisdiction, and other areas.100 Many others participated
in major legislative movements, such as the notable Pawnee attorney,
Walter Echo-Hawk, whose advocacy for American Indian human remains
and religious freedoms, contributed to the passage of several major statutes.
Time and time again, these attorneys recounted a personal dimension of
their advocacy. As Echo-Hawk said after the burial of hundreds of
thousands of Indian remains, “Many of them were likely my own
relatives.”101 Tom Fredericks, a member of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and
Arikara Nation, who has shared the indelible childhood memory of losing
the family ranch to government condemnation of reservation lands, went on
to represent tribes in government, regulatory, and transactional matters,
education of English and Indian youth. Caleb Cheeshahteaumuck of the Wampanoag Tribe,
Class of 1665, was the first Native American to graduate from Harvard. . . . Despite the
University’s pledge in its Charter to actively facilitate the education of American Indian
youth, it was not until 1970 that a program was established to specifically address Native
American issues.”). Dozens of American Indian graduates of Harvard Law School have
gone on to prominent careers as tribal lawyers. See, e.g., Emily Dupraz, For the Next
Generation: Two Brothers Advocate for the Sovereignty of Their People, HARV. L. BULL.,
Summer 2008, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2008/summer/cn_02
.php (describing the careers of Steve Emery and Mark Van Norman, Cheyenne River Sioux
tribal members and Harvard Law School graduates who have devoted their work to Indian
law at the tribal and federal levels); see also Patrice Kunesh, Living the Lessons We Have
Learned: A Native American Student Ponders the Lives of Her Harvard, HARV. GAZETTE
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/04/living-the-lessons-we-havelearned/.
99. See Rennard Strickland & Gloria Valencia-Weber, Observations on the Evolution of
Indian Law in the Law Schools, 26 N.M. L. REV. 153, 158–59 (1996) (identifying early
teachers and scholars of federal Indian law).
100. See Diane J. Schmidt, “The First 13” Brings Together Indian Law Pioneers,
NAVAJO TIMES, Apr. 5, 2012, available at http://navajotimes.com/politics/2012/0412/040512
law.php; see also Press Release, Am. Indian Law Ctr., Inc., First 13 Native American
Attorneys To Argue Before the U.S. Supreme Court Unite at Legal Symposium (Mar. 12,
2012), available at http://www.ailc-inc.org/PDF%20files/AILC%20-%20First%20Thirteen
%20Press%20Release.pdf .
101. Janet Varnum, Walter Echo-Hawk II: Fighting for Justice, STATE, http://state
magazine.okstate.edu/content/profile-walter-echo-hawk-ii (last visited Apr. 19, 2013)
(“Echo-Hawk’s work on groundbreaking legislation includes the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978, the National Museum of American Indians Act of 1989, the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 and the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994.”); see also Jack F. Trope and Walter R. EchoHawk, The Native American Graves Protection And Repatriation Act: Background and
Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35 (1992).
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especially concerning land and natural resources.102 Many non-Indians
have also demonstrated lifelong commitments to advocate for tribes and
have done so with great success.103
Not long ago, the tribal attorney and Mohawk tribal member Dale White
observed, “Indian law is definitely a ‘growth industry’” with more and
more opportunities for tribal lawyers.104 As we write in 2013, the practice
of Indian law is still growing and changing. NARF, along with the ILRC,
legal services organizations, and dozens of law firms, both large and small,
are providing legal counsel directly to tribes—in tribal, state, federal, and
international matters.105 Many of the 566 federally recognized tribes have
in-house legal counsel, and many have entire legal departments and offices,
both on reservations and in Washington, D.C. The number of American
Indian lawyers has grown from estimates of twenty-five total in the 1960s
to over 3,000 in 2006.106 The Federal Bar Association107 and ABA108 both
have sections devoted to American Indian Law, and there is a very active
network of professionals in the field, including national, state, and tribal bar
associations devoted to Indian law practice.109 The self-determination
movement continues to thrive in Indian Country, shaping both external
relations with federal and state governments and the internal revitalization
of tribal law, institutions, and societies. There have been major setbacks,
such as the Supreme Court’s backlash against American Indian rights from
102. See Linda Sailer, Fredericks Dedicates Life to Indian Law, DICK. PRESS, (Sept. 28,
2011), http://www.thedickinsonpress.com/event/article/id/51634/.
103. There are hundreds of examples around the country; at NARF alone, the senior staff
attorneys Kim Gottschalk, Steven Moore, Don Wharton, and others are known for their
lifetime commitments to American Indian tribal rights.
104. See Dale T. White, Tribal Law Practice: From the Outside to the Inside, 10 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 509 (2000). For additional stories of tribal lawyers, see, for example,
Dupraz, supra note 98 (recounting the education and careers of Cheyenne River Sioux
Attorneys Steven C. Emery and Mark Van Norman who were instructed by their
grandfather, “Takoja (Grandson), there are many people on the reservation that need help.
Before you return home, learn a skill that will let you provide assistance to your relatives.”);
Bruce Frankel, Standing Her Ground: A Native Alaskan, Once a School Dropout, Defends
Her People’s Claims to Much of the State, PEOPLE (Feb. 23, 1999), http://www.people.com/
people/archive/article/0,,20124560,00.html (describing the life, education, and career of
Alaska-native attorney Heather Kendall-Miller).
105. For a list of small, medium, and large firms with specialties in American Indian law,
see Best Law Firms, U.S NEWS & WORLD REP., http://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/search
.aspx?practice-area-id=79&practice-area=Native+American+Law&order-by=practice-area&
page=1 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). While we draw from very rich sources on tribal
lawyering, we note in particular that there is a paucity of literature on large firm
representation of Indian tribes, and that the fields of Indian law and professional
responsibility would benefit from additional work in this vein. Additional areas of research
would include study on the newest generation of tribal attorneys, graduating from law school
after 2000, whose stories are not described in detail in the literature.
106. See Our History, supra note 97.
107. See, e.g., Indian Law Section, FED. B. ASS’N, http://www.fedbar.org/sections/indianlaw-section.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
108. See, e.g., Committee on Native American Concerns, AM. B. ASS’N, http://apps
.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=IR514000 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
109. See NAT’L NATIVE AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.nativeamericanbar.org/ (last visited
Apr. 19, 2013).
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1988 to the present, but overall this is a time of unprecedented growth and
opportunity in American Indian law. It is this legal landscape, with all of
its professional opportunities and challenges that the contemporary tribal
lawyer inhabits.
E. The Contemporary Tribal Lawyer
By “tribal lawyer,” we mean a lawyer who represents an American
Indian tribe. This definition excludes federal government lawyers who
often work on Indian law matters, both for and against tribes, but are
formally representing the United States.110 It also excludes, for the most
part, lawyers for individual Indians, unless those individual Indians are
elected tribal leaders whose participation in litigation actually signifies the
tribe’s participation. Tribal lawyers can be American Indian or not, and we
comment below on some of the particular issues raised by this question of
identity. We should say at the outset that there are now thousands of
lawyers working for Indian tribes and we cannot name all of them or
describe the work of each.
The paradigmatic example of the tribal lawyer is one who works
exclusively or primarily for one of the 566 federally recognized Indian
tribes. Depending on the size of the tribe, the office might have one to ten
lawyers who work on a variety of issues. A tribal lawyer who is “inhouse,” usually lives and works on or near the reservation of the tribal
client; tribal lawyers who work at firms or other organizations live and
work in cities, small towns, and rural areas around the country. If a typical
job description for tribal attorney exists, it is to represent the tribe acting
through its elected officials—possibly including the tribal president, chief,
or chair; the legislative counsel; and other leaders—in the business of tribal
government. Tribal attorneys provide advice on the enactment and
interpretation of legislation; represent the tribe in tribal, state, and federal
court litigation; negotiate with the local, state, and federal governments;
maintain relationships with the BIA and other federal agencies; and advise
the tribe on financial matters and commercial transactions.111
Substantively, tribal lawyers may work on everything from an initial
political and organizational struggle for federal recognition, to cultural
questions surrounding the repatriation of religious items, to complex
financings for casinos and other commercial developments, to major
litigation over treaty rights and jurisdiction.112

110. See, e.g., Lawrence Baca, Reflections on the Role of the United States Department of
Justice in Enforcing the Indian Civil Rights Act, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY
(Kristen Carpenter et al. eds., 2012).
111. Bellmard, supra note 56, at 755.
112. Consider the example of John Petoskey, a Michigan lawyer who served as in-house
counsel for his tribe, the Grand Traverse Bay Band of Odawa and Chippewa Indians, from
1987 to 2010. During that time, according to news reports, the Grand Traverse Bay Band
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Tribes also engage outside counsel for legal representation, either to
serve as general counsel if they do not have an in-house office or for
representation in specialty areas. Boutique law firms specializing in federal
Indian law and large law firms with departments in federal Indian law
handle many of these needs. Some tribes have a “go-to” law firm with
whom they have worked for generations, while others shop for the
appropriate counsel in a particular case, and still others keep a lot of their
work in house.113
Tribal attorney Ken Bellmard has been an attorney for several Oklahoma
tribes and written reflectively about his work.114 He describes his career as
spanning many substantive areas and skill sets, and highly affected by
politics. Bellmard is a Kaw tribal member who was first hired by the 300member Tonkawa Tribe and quickly received an education in tribal
lawyering:
The Tonkawa Tribe is . . . established pursuant to a page and one-half
constitution, and governed by a elected committee of three people. The
fact that the Tonkawa Tribe was governed by just three people allowed
the Tribe to deal with matters very quickly and efficiently, but because the
Tribe was so small family relationships were very strong and very
contentious. My education as a tribal attorney was about to begin.

With respect to client identity, Bellmard is clear that “[b]eing a tribal
attorney for a small tribe for the most part requires one to be an advocate
for the tribe’s government, i.e., the elected body.”115 In this capacity, as the
“evolved from a small Indian tribe that operated on a shoestring budget for years after its
federal recognition in 1980 to a major economic powerhouse and employer in northern
Michigan that runs two casinos and the Grand Traverse Resort & Spa.” Bill O’Brien,
Longtime GT Bond Attorney Let Go, REC.-EAGLE (Feb. 3, 2010), http://record-eagle.com/
local/x1512274558/Longtime-GT-Band-attorney-let-go. A graduate of PLSI and the
University of New Mexico Law School, Petoskey represented his own tribe in a wide array
of work including litigation, commercial transactions, intergovernmental diplomacy, and
internal institution building. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, John Petoskey’s Legal Career (So
Far) . . . Updated, TURTLE TALK (Feb. 3, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/
2010/02/03/john-petoskeys-legal-career-so-far/. After twenty-three years, Petoskey lost his
in-house position to political “restructuring” and went on to become a partner at a national
Indian law boutique. Grand Traverse Band Eliminates General Counsel Post, INDIANZ.COM
(Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.indianz.com/News/2010/018250.asp.
113. For another detailed example of the work and career of a tribal attorney and tribal
legal department, see, for example, Gayle Johnson & Venus Prince, Legal Department,
POARCH CREEK NEWS, July 2009, at 5, available at http://www.poarchcreekindians.org/
assets/pdf/newsletter_jul_2009.pdf. Venus McGhee Prince, a Poarch Creek tribal member
who is the Attorney General for her tribe in Alabama, explains that she leads a four member
legal department whose job is “to protect all Tribal assets, defend the integrity of the Tribe,
and assist and advise all Tribal entities in their pursuit of progress.” Id. In terms of the
client, the attorneys are “responsible for providing legal services and representation to the
Tribe, its Tribal Council, Tribal Government, and all Tribal authorities, commissions,
enterprises, and other entities.” Id. Consistent with this mission, “the Legal Department does
not currently provide direct legal services to individual Tribal Members,” but recognizes a
need and “has proposed the creation of a Legal Aid.” Id.
114. Bellmard, supra note 56, at 755.
115. Id.
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legal representative for the tribe acting through its tribal government, the
tribal attorney will (1) “be involved in intra-tribal disputes (removals and
recalls)”; (2) “necessarily be involved in disputes with the state and local
government (sovereignty issues)”; and (3) “will be involved in disputes
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).”116 Bellmard describes the latter
disputes as the most difficult for him and his tribal clients, remembering
instances where, in his view, the BIA seemed to retaliate when the tribe
took “progressive” positions.117 After the Tonkawa leadership decided to
work on a nuclear waste facility, the BIA allegedly supported a group of
tribal citizens who tried to remove the elected officials.118
Bellmard describes these external and internal impediments to
representing the tribe as frustrating—saying that he learned that “you
cannot expect much help from the BIA and that at any given time half the
tribal membership is going to think you are a devil.”119 An equally
frustrating experience occurred when, during his representation of the
Osage Tribe, the United States “de-recognized” the Osage Nation (which
would later be restored). Bellmard notes that he went on to more “positive
and professionally rewarding” experiences as attorney for the Miami Tribe,
and also worked for the Absentee Shawnee, Otoe-Missouri, Ponca, and
Comanche Tribes.120 In this process, he developed certain skill sets, such
as in commercial dealings, and recognized other areas, such as repatriation,
in which he lacked the necessary cultural competence and referred the
matter to another attorney.121
Several points can be generalized about the work of the tribal attorney in
the self-determination era. Many tribes are still involved in major litigation,
especially in cases testing the scope of treaty rights and tribal jurisdiction.
Some of these cases may be resolved through intergovernmental
agreements, particularly in the tax and gaming contexts. Relatedly, many
tribes are engaged in major development projects to fund the tribal
government and economy. And, internally, tribal governments are focused
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 755–56 (“[A] group of Tribal members attempted to remove the officials and
this process was supported by the BIA. During testimony that was given in the Tonkawa
CFR Court it came to light that the removal petition in question had been drafted with the
input of the BIA. . . . The resulting federal court case regarding the BIA interference with
the Tonkawa election process in Combrink v. Babbitt resulted in a victory for the tribal
plaintiffs. The victory was however hollow. By the time the decision came down a
subsequent election had been held and the plaintiffs, worn down from their continuing
battles with the BIA had retired from tribal politics, the land claim in Texas was not
supported and the waste site gambit was lost. Six years after the Tonkawa Compact was
approved the Tribe has never taken advantage of their right to a form of Class III gaming.”).
119. Id. at 756.
120. Id. at 756–60.
121. Id. at 757–58; see also Teddye Snell, Media Ousted from UKB Meeting, TAHLEQUAH
DAILY PRESS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://tahlequahdailypress.com/local/x471035951/Mediaousted-from-UKB-meeting (describing Ken Bellmard as “Attorney General” for the United
Keetoowah Band of Indians in incident where press was barred from tribal government
meeting).
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on “nation building” including the reform of legal institutions and law, such
as tribal courts and legislative codes. Tribal lawyers find themselves
representing tribes in all of these capacities and more. As Bellmard’s
comments begin to suggest, this work brings both particular challenges and
opportunities for the tribal lawyer.
Over the course of his career, Bellmard says that he “changed from a
young attorney wanting to ‘save’ all the Oklahoma tribes into a cynical
experienced attorney who understands that all tribes are different and are
potential competitors to one another in the business world. . . . I have
become more of a ‘mechanic’ rather than an ‘evangelist.’”122 This point is
critical and underscores the notion that the work and role of the tribal
attorney is just as fraught with ethical complexity as any other practice, if
not more so. The anecdotes described in this Article, with a few obvious
exceptions, should not be oversimplified to suggest that there is a
dichotomy between “good” and “bad” attorneys for tribes. If anything, the
involvement of tribes in government, business, culture, and religion
suggests that tribal lawyers will be called on to juggle different values and
objectives.123 Moreover, as tribes work to emerge from layers of
subordination experienced through the colonial process, they and their
lawyers engage in various strategies, some of which may be more or less
appealing to certain constituencies and audiences.124 Today’s tribal lawyer
may be fighting to protect tribal sovereignty against the encroachments of
state and federal governments, and doing so as a lobbyist, jockeying for
influence with legislators;125 working to address tribal poverty and
unemployment through economic development strategies that include
122. Bellmard, supra note 56, at 759.
123. See, e.g., Gale Couery Toensig, Poarch Creek Band Stops Controversial Casino
Expansion on Hickory Ground Sacred Site, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 17, 2012,
available
at
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/poarch-band-stopscontroversial-casino-expansion-on-hickory-ground-sacred-site-140654
(describing
communications by tribal attorneys representing tribal leaders on opposite sides of proposal
to develop casino on historic Creek town site and burial ground).
124. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, The Jurisgenerative Moment
in Indigenous Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220573.
125. The most infamous tribal lobbyist of all time, Jack Abramoff, “was at the center of a
lobbying conglomerate that defrauded Indian tribes of millions and used much of that money
to try to win favor with members of Congress and their senior staff members.” Neil A.
Lewis, Abramoff Gets Four Years in Prison for Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2008, at
A13. While Abramoff, who was convicted of corruption and tax evasion and sentenced to
four years in prison, engaged in conduct that was clearly illegal, other lobbyists face more
nuanced ethical dilemmas, such as how to handle tensions between wealthy and poor tribal
interests, tribes with and without large land bases, and whether to represent corporate or state
interests adverse to tribes other than the particular client. In the best models, tribal lobbyists
partner with other Indian activists to pass important legislation, such as the Violence Against
Women Act with its new provisions for American Indian women. See, e.g., Rob Capriccioso,
President Barack Obama’s VAWA Law Signing Spotlights Native Women Warriors, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 11, 2013, available at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2013/03/11/president-barack-obamas-vawa-law-signing-spotlights-native-women-warriors148105.
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casino gaming, payday lending, or natural resource extraction;126 or
defending the tribe’s interests in choosing its own citizens, developing its
institutions, and protecting tribal finances—in cases that may pit the tribe
against minorities excluded from tribal citizenship, employees trying to
organize labor unions, or individuals injured on tribal property.127 In the
next part, we analyze the role of tribal lawyers in the myriad contexts where
they work against the backdrop of the professional responsibility literature’s
conceptions of the role of lawyers more generally.
III. PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY, ROLE, AND RULES
MEET TRIBAL LAWYERING
In this part we seek to integrate the story of Indian tribes and the law with
conceptions of lawyering. We first describe the dominant model of
lawyering, known as the Standard Conception, as it reflects a strong
attachment to the rule of law and representation of clients as individuals.
We then consider how Indian tribes often come to legal representation with
different baselines—namely a complicated relationship with the rule of law,
and core interests held by a group with particular cultural values—that
reveal certain limitations of the Rules as they apply in the attorney-tribal
client relationship.
A. The Dominant Professional Ideology and Role of American Lawyers
The American legal profession consists of well over a million lawyers
who practice in a variety of practice areas, arenas, and organizational
settings. And while these lawyers subscribe to different schools of thought,
pursue different values, and promote different commitments, they by and
large adhere to a dominant professional ideology grounded in a few basic
assumptions about the rule of law and the role of lawyers. In America,
opined Thomas Paine, “law is king” constituting the social glue that holds
our diverse melting pot together. Law is a civic religion; its constitutive
documents—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill
of Rights—capture and define what it means to be an American. The rule
of law is not merely an acceptance of law and order as a necessary
condition, but an embrace of the rule of law as a constitutive feature of
America that embodies a way of life in which law emerges not merely as a
way to resolve disputes but as the way to engage in private and public
decision making. In particular, it is a conception of law that treats

126. For a primer on tribal economic development, see Lorie M. Graham, An
Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV.
597, 599–608 (2004) (describing the right to development as a human right that requires
nuanced analysis of social, cultural, and other conditions in indigenous context).
127. For examples of tribal court cases evaluating civil rights in Indian Country, see
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 351–82 (2011).
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individuals and the exercise of individual autonomy as the basic unit of
society.128
Lawyers, accordingly, are high priests of this civic religion, aristocratic
members of a ruling class, guardians of the rule of law, which means
zealous advocates of individual autonomy. Law is thus understood as a
shield against intrusion on the individual and celebrated as a sword in
defense of individual autonomy and the aggressive pursuit of self-interest.
And this conception of law and lawyers is by no means a theoretical or
abstract exercise. It informs the Standard Conception of American lawyers’
professional ideology, is reflected in its twin postulates of zealous advocacy
and nonaccountability, and it defines the role of lawyers.129
The principle of zealous advocacy portrays lawyers as knights in shining
armor. Whether defending individuals against accusations of wrongdoing
by the state or other individuals, or negotiating claims on behalf of clients’
self-interest, lawyers emerge as a positive force pursuing the most
important of values: clients’ exercise of individual autonomy. Lawyers’
“warm zeal” and aggression on behalf of clients is explained exactly in
terms of the cardinal importance of the subject of defense—the individual
and his or her zone of autonomy.130
Nonaccountability neatly follows. Exactly because autonomous clients
are celebrated as the core unit of society, and the goal of lawyers is to
enhance clients’ autonomy, clients and clients alone are morally and legally
deemed responsible for the objectives of the attorney-client relationships.
Lawyers, the mouthpiece of clients, are not morally or otherwise
accountable for the goals they help clients pursue exactly because making
lawyers responsible would compromise the position of clients as
autonomous kings vested with sole authority and thus responsibility for
their conduct. Finally, the Standard Conception informs the role of
American lawyers as first and foremost representatives of clients, with only
128. Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Practices
of New York City Lawyers, 1879–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST–CIVIL
WAR AMERICA 51, 51–74 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (exploring the elevated role and
status of lawyers in American society); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
301–11 (Henry Reeve trans., 1900) (discussing the status of lawyers as America’s
aristocracy); THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 29 (1776) (observing “that in America The
Law Is King”); Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers As America’s Governing Class: The Formation
and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001).
129. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 115–16; see also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral
Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
613, 617; Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 672–75 (1978). See generally Russell G. Pearce, Professional
Responsibility for the Age of Obama: Reviewing David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human
Dignity, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1594, 1600 (2009) (book review); Murray L. Schwartz,
The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’
ETHICS 150–71 (David Luban ed., 1984).
130. Eli Wald, Loyalty In Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients,
40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 909 (2009); see also Pepper, supra note 129.
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token references to the minor roles of officers of the legal system and public
citizens.131
Critics of the Standard Conception, to be sure, abound. William Simon,
for example, grounds his theory of law practice and the role of lawyers in
justice, rather than in the pursuit of client interests narrowly conceived.
Lawyers should not, argues Simon, help clients pursue goals that impose
injustice on others, and lawyers should listen to clients’ conceptions of
justice rather than impute to their clients objectives and goals. But
ultimately, what emerges from Simon’s theory is a herculean lawyer, a
social engineer of sorts who knows best how to pursue justice on behalf of
clients.132 Tony Kronman, another critic of the Standard Conception,
bemoans the decline of lawyers as statesmen, philosopher kings, and social
engineers who, through the exercise of practical wisdom and professional
judgment, act as the benevolent governing class and natural leaders of our
society.133 Brad Wendel advocates near religious allegiance or fidelity to
the law, in which the law is put on a pedestal and lawyers become its high
priests.134 Ironically, common to all of these critics of the Standard
Conception is an unquestionable belief in the law as a positive, desirable
constitutive aspect of American life. Simon never questions the centrality
of law to justice, and all three scholars conceive of lawyers as powerful
actors vested with great responsibility for the public and private good.
Even David Luban, who rejects role morality and advocates for common
morality as the cornerstone of lawyers’ professional ideology and role does
not question the centrality of law and the inherent relevance of the rule of
law to core values such as fairness and dignity.135
B. The Dominant Ideology and Tribal Lawyering
It is exactly this profound trust and love of the law, in its AngloAmerican incarnation, that American Indian tribes do not necessarily share.
Indeed, European and American legal institutions and actors used the rule
of law to displace, or attempt to displace, tribes’ own legal traditions and
systems, and thereby disrupt tribal governments and cultures.136 In a
131. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the application of the Standard Conception to
group lawyers, including government attorneys.
132. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS
54–62 (1998).
133. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
134. See generally W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO THE LAW (2010).
135. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007). For a
critical analysis of the role autonomous self-interest plays in contemporary thinking, practice
and regulation of lawyers, see Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers To
Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011); Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Beyond Cardboard Lawyers
in Legal Ethics, 15 LEGAL ETHICS 147 (2012) (reviewing W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS
AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010)).
136. Rennard Strickland, Take Us By the Hand: Challenges of Becoming an Indian
Lawyer, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 47, 55 (1974).
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historical context, then, the rule of law stood not as a desirable cornerstone
of society but as a more complicated device that tribes confronted during
the process of conquest and colonialism.
On the one hand, European and American governments relied on the rule
of law as a “legitimizing” factor in the dispossession of Indian lands,
removal of Indian peoples, and imposition of colonial, state, and federal
governing powers.137 In this view, the rule of law was a foreign tool of
colonialist aggression, and lawyers were not knights in shining armor but
manipulative instruments of abuse who, even in good faith, fatally
compromised tribes’ positions and values.138 Whereas the rule of law is
billed by the Standard Conception as America’s social glue, to tribes, the
very same law functioned to justify conquest and impose Anglo-American
values and expediencies on Indian claims. As the discussion above about
the Marshall Trilogy suggests, the Supreme Court first justified conquest of
American Indians by reference to the Doctrine of Discovery. Subsequently,
tribes found that the courts would change and modify the rule of law to
facilitate the colonial project. Tribes negotiated treaties in good faith, only
to have the Supreme Court hold that Congress could break them;139 tribes
litigated their ancient land claims in the ICC, only to learn that the courts
would limit their remedies to monetary damages.140 Today, the Supreme
Court tells us that even when tribes reacquire their own treaty-guaranteed
lands on the open market, they cannot reclaim governing authority over
them because equities and statutory interpretation favors the non-Indian
settlers and governments that prefer state jurisdiction.141 In these
experiences, the law, legal system, and lawyers are all instruments of the
colonizing machine. If the law is “king,” it is a monarch bent on oppressing
American Indian people.
From another perspective, however, Indian tribes have always been
agents of their own realities. Even faced with horrible choices in the face of
destructive forces, tribal leaders have nonetheless made meaningful and
informed choices, including use of the rule of law as a tool of resistance. In
the 1830s, for example, the Cherokees were faced with mounting personal
violence and destruction of property at the hands of white settlers. It was
only when petitions to Congress and the President failed that the Cherokee
National Council authorized Principal Chief John Ross to resort to the

137. The leading source here is WILLIAMS, supra note 21.
138. See Vicenti, supra note 49.
139. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (holding that congressional
abrogation of Indian treaty’s land guarantees is a nonjusticiable political question).
140. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 74, at 469.
141. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 (2005) (“The
Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins of government and cannot regain them through
open-market purchases from current titleholders.”). For scholarship criticizing the Sherrill
opinion, see Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A
Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
41 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2005); Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title,
Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006).
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courts to try to save the Cherokee Nation.142 The Cherokee Nation used a
deliberative process in its decisions to engage legal counsel in the struggle,
seeking to hire the most effective lawyers, even while struggling to pay
them.143 Ross’s own view of the situation, as articulated to the Cherokee
National Council, was that “in the appearance of impossibilities, there is
still hope,”144 a statement that suggests not naïveté but resilience in the face
of overwhelming odds.
Moreover, despite the immediate devastation suffered by the Cherokees
and other tribes during the Removal era, it is also true that the rules
announced in the Cherokee Nation and Worcester cases—that Indian
nations retain reserved rights of self-governance and property, and the
United States has an obligation to protect those interests until such time as it
chooses expressly to extinguish them—have in many cases served a real
and meaningful function for tribes.145 As we write in 2013, 566 federally
recognized tribal nations remain self-governing entities, often focused on
revitalizing their cultures and societies, with some legal protection against
the encroachments of states.146 Yet, when those tribes are faced with
challenges, they again often turn to the American legal system to vindicate
their rights, sometimes successfully. Courts, along with the legislative and
executive branches, do recognize treaty rights, self-government, and federal
trust obligations, to some extent.147 In this perspective, the law is indeed a
powerful tool for American Indian advocacy.
At the end of the day, both narratives reveal certain core truths. The
United States has used the law as a tool of conquest and colonization with
devastating effects on Indian tribes; and tribes have used the law as a tool
142. See GARY E. MOULTON, JOHN ROSS, CHEROKEE CHIEF 34–52 (1978). Moulton
describes in great detail the Cherokee Nation’s advocacy before Congress, as well as to the
President and the judiciary, including the engagement of seven lawyers for litigation in the
Georgia courts, followed by the engagement of William Wirt for the Supreme Court. See id.
at 44–45.
143. Id. at 44–45 (describing the Nation’s struggle to cover attorney fees and the
ineffectiveness of some of the lawyers in the state court actions).
144. Id. at 41.
145. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14 (1987) (stating that the “old laws”
of federal Indian law, namely treaties and treaty substitutes, created a “measured separatism”
for Indian nations, reservations and territories where they could maintain self-government
and culture, albeit in limited fashion).
146. See FLETCHER, supra note 127, at 67–92 (describing tribal justice systems);
Catherine T. Struve, Sovereign Litigants: Native American Nations in Court, 55 VILL. L.
REV. 929, 934–35 (2010) (same); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Looking to the East: The
Stories of Modern Indian People and the Development of Tribal Law, 5 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, Looking to the East]; Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57 (2007)
[hereinafter Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law]; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme
Court’s Legal Culture War Against Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93
(2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War].
147. See Getches, supra note 50, at 1620–22, 1630–52 (describing the Rehnquist Court’s
departure from the rules of federal Indian law and expressing hope for a return to
foundational principles).
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of resistance and protection, with some success in the legal institutions of
the United States. Today, as a result, the conversation among Indian law
scholars often focuses on how best “decolonize” Indian law, both in its
federal and tribal law incarnations.148 Suggestions include reversing
problematic rules of federal Indian common law,149 engaging in federal
legal reform through legislative and administrative programs,150 promoting
advocacy in international human rights forums,151 and a more intense focus
on the role of tribal institutions in reforming their own laws.152 On the last
point, tribes today are revitalizing their own tribal legal systems—legal
systems that in many respects have been infected with the vestiges of
colonialism—by reinfusing their own legal institutions with tribal values,
norms, and procedures that have both internal and external legitimacy.153
In short, the relationship between tribes and the law is complicated one and
lawyers play a complicated role in it.
148. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for
a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 121 (1994) (discussing reform of
federal Indian law); Robert B. Porter, Building a New Longhouse: The Case for Government
Reform Within the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 805, 934 (1998)
(advocating decolonization efforts within tribal nations); Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the
Hanodaganyas To Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899,
904 (1998); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV.
219, 220–26 (discussing federal Indian law as colonial and vision for reformation).
149. Williams, supra note 148, at 293 (calling for the “surrender” of the “doctrine of
discovery”).
150. See Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, Coherence and Conciliation
in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1777–84 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey,
Adjudication and Its Discontents] (calling for advocates to consider decolonization of federal
Indian law through a move from adjudication of rights to a sovereign-to-sovereign
relationship in which tribes work with Congress and administrative agencies on legal
problems); Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and
Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf,
38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 32 n.149 (2003) (“Of course, [Oliphant and Duro] are ‘only’ federal
common law, so Congress may alter them . . . . Or can it?”).
151. See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2004)
(“International law’s embrace of human rights . . . engenders a discourse that is an
alternative to the state-centered, historical sovereignty one, a discourse that has yielded
results within the international system for indigenous peoples.”).
152. Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
841, 865–66; cf. AUSTIN, supra note 24, at xvii (describing “a unique side to tribal court
jurisprudence in the United States . . . [that] involves retrieving ancient tribal values,
customs, and norms and using them to solve contemporary legal issues”); JOHN BORROWS,
CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION 23–55 (2010) [hereinafter BORROWS, CANADA’S
INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION] (describing sources and categories of indigenous law including
sacred, natural, deliberative, positivistic, and customary); JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING
CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW xii (2002) [hereinafter BORROWS,
RECOVERING CANADA] (“[T]he power of Aboriginal law can still be discerned despite the
pervasiveness of imported law.”).
153. Compare Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)
(expressing concerns about non-tribal members faced with tribal court jurisdiction, including
whether their rights will be protected and whether they will be familiar with the applicable
law), with AUSTIN, supra note 24, at xvii (on the importance of using tribal norms in tribal
justice systems).
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Here we seek to integrate this story—of Indian tribes and the law—with
conceptions of lawyering. We reflect on the limitations of the dominant
model and alternative conceptions that are already functioning in American
Indian communities and that may enlarge the understanding of group
lawyering more broadly. The dominant understanding of law produces and
legitimizes the Standard Conception of zealous advocacy and lawyers’
nonaccountability as the baseline for lawyering. In tribal contexts, a
different understanding of law undermines the legitimacy of the Standard
Conception. The core inherent unit of representation in the case of tribes is
not an individual but the tribe, and the core mission is not the assertion of
individual autonomy but collective group rights, self-determination, and the
preservation of cultural values and tradition.
Zealous representation, as typically construed, may not be a sufficiently
capacious model for effective representation of goals that necessarily
require attention to relationships and the revitalization of the tribal
community. To be sure, zealous advocacy is appropriate in some
circumstances—for example, when the effective representation of tribes
calls for aggressive advocacy vis-à-vis powerful federal, state, or corporate
interests. It may even be appropriate when tribes defend against suits by
tribal members.154 We emphatically support the idea that tribes, like all
other clients, deserve a well-trained lawyer who will use the law to
advocate powerfully for them.155 For generations, the lack of access to
154. Tribal members sue tribes over a variety of claims, from employment discrimination
in employment to liability for injuries sustained on tribal properties. A poignant category of
cases concerns tribal membership, cases with great import in the self-determination and
decolonization era, and great ramifications for lawyering and ethics. The foundational case
is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), in which Julia Martinez, a Santa
Clara woman, after years of internal advocacy, challenged a discriminatory tribal
membership rule in federal court, arguing that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1978 imposed a
standard of equal protection on tribal government. The tribe defended, and won, on grounds
that the ICRA did not provide a cause of action or waive sovereign immunity except for
habeas cases. Julia Martinez was represented by Richard Collins, then of DNA Legal
Services, a provider of individual legal services located on the Navajo reservation, along
with Alan Taradasah and Tim Vollman. All three would go on to very distinguished careers
in federal Indian law. The Pueblo was represented by Marcelino Prelo, Jr., a practitioner in
New Mexico, with a number of amicus briefs submitted by other Indian tribes and prominent
lawyers in the field. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Three Stories in One: The Story of Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, in INDIAN LAW STORIES, supra note 37, at 456 n.17. As several
waves of scholarship have considered, the case arguably pitted individual (women’s) rights
against tribal rights, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAW 66 (1987), as well as American-style rights and litigation against tribal
kinship and methods of dispute resolution. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Rina Swentzell
& Eva Petoskey, Indigenous Women’s Reflections, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT
FORTY, supra note 110, at 39–52. We note that Martinez, and contemporary membership
cases such as that of the Cherokee Freedmen (African descendants who claim treaty-based
membership in the Cherokee Nation) could provide very interesting case studies of the
professional responsibilities of the lawyers for the individual claimants and for the tribes,
alike. See S. Alan Ray, Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of
Freedmen’s Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387 (2007).
155. See Sam Deloria, Legal Education and Native People, 38 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV.
22, 25–38 (1974).
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such legal counsel was a major, disempowering factor for tribes. But in an
era of self-determination and decolonization of Indian law, zealous
advocacy is by no means the default modus operandi in every instance of
tribal representation.
Indian law is increasingly characterized by
intergovernmental negotiations and transactions with business partners that
may call for constructive engagement as much as robust assertions of
rights.156 Even with respect to litigation, some advocates have suggested
that the most contested tribal claims—such as religious freedoms and treaty
rights—should be decided with attention to the “intercultural” relations that
must inform what they see as the ultimate goal of “reconciliation.”157 This
point is particularly apt when it comes to conflicts with neighboring
communities, which may include longtime non-Indian residents or other
indigenous peoples.158 Within the tribal community, zealous advocacy may
disrupt tribal relations, such as those within clans or societies, or usurp the
authority of traditional dispute resolution by village or religious leaders.159
Similarly, while nonaccountability may be appropriate in the context of
empowering individual clients to assert their autonomous self-interest while
acting as the client’s mouthpiece, it is far from intuitive or inevitable in
cultures where all individuals, including legal professionals, may be
expected to be accountable to the community, its needs, and its values.160
Again, there are difficulties associated with this view. Additional
professional and ethical obligations, particularly emerging and undeveloped
156. Examples include tribal-industry agreements in natural resources arrangements to
tribal-state agreements on a variety of regulatory matters. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73
(2007) (discussing tribal-state relations on law enforcement, taxation, environmental
regulation, and casino gaming); Lynn Slade, Indian Tribes: Business Partners and Market
Participants, Natural Resource Development on Indian Lands (2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at www.modrall.com/files/1411_tribal_industry_partners.pdf
(discussing natural resource partnerships among tribes, industry, and the federal
government).
157. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the
Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1664–70 (2000); Howard J. Vogel, The
Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural Conflict over Native
American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757, 758–60 (2001).
158. See Robin Kimmerer, The Rights of the Land: The Onondaga Nation of Central
New York Proposes a Radical New Vision of Property Rights, ORION MAG. (Nov./Dec.
2008), http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/3647 (“The Onondaga
people know the pain of displacement too well to inflict it on their neighbors.”).
159. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian
Tribal Constitutional Law, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY, supra note 110, at
189–93 (discussing the reluctance of certain tribal courts to hear cases regarding religious
matters typically addressed by traditional religious leaders). See generally RICHLAND, supra
note 22, at 42 (discussing the treatment of Hopi claims, traditionally involving clan, gender,
and religious dimensions, in the modern tribal court system). For a discussion of relational
self-interest as an alternative theory, see Pearce & Wald, supra note 135; Wald & Pearce,
supra note 135.
160. See, e.g., Amelia V. Katanski, Writing the Living Law: American Indian Literature
As Legal Narrative, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 53, 64–73 (2007) (on themes of accountability,
spirituality, recovery and nation-building as they pertain to legal advocacy in an Anishinabe
community, as illustrated by Winona LaDuke’s fictional work, LAST STANDING WOMAN).
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ones, may disincentivize lawyers from taking Indian clients, diminishing
the opportunities for tribes to secure the best possible advice and counsel.
This may be particularly true when tribes need lawyers who practice in
specialized areas—commercial lending or appellate advocacy—where a
responsibility to become expert on American Indian culture and history has
simply not been part of the lawyer’s training. Yet, it is also true that
without some guidance on accountability, lawyers may play an unwitting
role in extending the legacy of conquest and harming the indigenous clients
that they seek to serve.161
Importantly, challenging the dominant understanding of law and the
professional ideology of lawyers is not an academic exercise. While the
dominant culture of autonomous self-interest no doubt impacts lawyers
irrespective of their specialized professional ideology and rules of
professional conduct, the Standard Conception informs and shapes the
Rules of Professional Conduct that actually govern the behavior of
practicing lawyers. Accordingly, an individually inspired, autonomy
enhancing ideology that ill fits the practice of lawyers for groups will tend
to produce Rules that ill serve tribal lawyers.
C. From Ideology to Role and Rules
The Preamble to the Model Rules states that a lawyer “is a representative
of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.”162 A plain reading of the Preamble
might suggest that a lawyer’s role may be conceived of as a three-legged
stool, with all three components of the role—representative of clients,
officer of the legal system, and public citizen—weighing equally. But it is
clear that the Rules treat representation of clients in the spirit of
empowering individual pursuit of self-interest as a lawyer’s primary goal.
Rules 1.1–1.18, 2.1–2.4, 5.1–5.7, and 7.1–7.6 essentially deal with the role
of the lawyer as a client representative. Only the much briefer sections 3
and 4 deal with some limited duties as an officer of the court, and section 6
indirectly states some aspirational duties as a public citizen. Indeed, the
only specific elaboration in the Rules regarding the lawyer’s role as an
“officer of the legal system” as opposed to an officer of the court comes in
the Preamble. Comment 5 states cryptically that “[a] lawyer should use the
law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or
intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system
and for those who serve it,”163 and comment 13 states that “[l]awyers play a
vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires
161. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. ROTH, BROKEN TRUST: GREED,
MISMANAGEMENT & POLITICAL MANIPULATION AT AMERICA’S LARGEST CHARITABLE TRUST
97–103 (2006) (discussing the role of lawyers in the mismanagement of the “Bishop Trust,”
established by Native Hawaiian royalty in the 1880s to fund education for Hawaiian
children).
162. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012).
163. Id. cmt. 5.
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an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The
Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that
relationship.”164 Comment 13 is nothing short of ironic because other than
that very comment, nothing in the Rules “serves to define” the relationship
of lawyers with the legal system.
Worse, the only clear reference to a lawyer’s role as a public citizen is
even shorter, appearing in comment 6:
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access
to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a
lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients,
employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal
education. . . . Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and
resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of
justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot
afford or secure adequate legal counsel.165

The same comment reminds lawyers of their allegiance to the lofty rule of
law: “In addition, a lawyer should further the public’s understanding of and
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation
and support to maintain their authority.”166
The individual emphasis in the Rules grounded in the conceptions of
client autonomy and self-interest, based on the professional ideology of the
Standard Conception and captured in the Preamble is then reflected in many
of the pertinent Rules, an emphasis that ill fits the representation of groups.
1. Competence
Rule 1.1 defines competence to encompass “legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”167 The Rule’s focus is on legal knowhow. Comment 1
explains that,
[i]n determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and
skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity
and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the
lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question . . . . In many
instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner.168

Comment 2 adds, “Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of
determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve” and
comment 8, titled Maintaining Competence, states that “[t]o maintain the
requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. cmt. 13.
Id. cmt. 6.
Id.
Id. R. 1.1 (emphasis added).
See id. cmt. 1.
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the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply
with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is
subject.”169 Nowhere does the rule or comments suggest the possible
relevance of other aspects of competence, such as knowledge of tribal
history, culture, and political organization.
Legal competence is of course an important aspect of an effective
attorney-client representation. But the narrow legalistic focus of Rule 1.1,
and its failure to even contemplate the inherent importance of cultural
competence are lamentable, foreclosing analysis and even awareness of an
important feature of representing groups such as tribes. Proposed federal
legislation to settle Navajo and Hopi claims on the Little Colorado River
recently went down when grassroots Navajos protested concessions to a
power plant and waiver of future claims.170 In a recent presentation,
Navajo activist Nicole Horseherder attributed the Navajo president’s initial
support for the legislation in part to a lack of understanding, by elected
officials and tribal attorneys, of the cultural values of traditional Navajos.171
Nothing in Rule 1.1 alerts a conscientious attorney to the relevance of
cultural considerations as an aspect of competence. In this sense, the
legalistic emphasis of the rule obscures, and even excludes, inherently
important aspects of the representation of tribes.
The importance of competence about tribal culture, history, and political
organization and their marginalization by the Rules were amplified by the
fact that, until the “self-determination” era, tribal lawyers were mostly nonIndians, outsiders to tribes.172 Indian law practitioners and scholars have
long argued for increased attention to tribal values and culture in legal
processes at every level.173 Pragmatically minded scholars have wondered
about the typical lawyer’s competency in this regard. In an interesting
commentary, the late Professor Phil Frickey observed:
[Scholars] have demonstrated that indigenous practices and values have
influenced federal Indian law, and under a broader conception of the field,
should influence it more substantially in the future. But how can any
transformation of the field occur when judges, cabined by the blinders of
precedent, will dismiss such indigenous aspects as irrelevant, and when
(largely non-Indian) scholars, though often sympathetic, will have
difficulty identifying the Indian side of the story, much less integrating it
into conceptual arguments for reform of the field.174

Of course the prescient Frickey largely answered his own question, though
the response to his rhetorical question is much clearer now with sixteen
169. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (emphasis added).
170. Kimmerer, supra note 158.
171. See Nicole Horseherder, Presentation, Heeding Frickey’s Call, Berkeley Law School
(Sept. 28, 2012). Coauthor Professor Carpenter attended this presentation.
172. Supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, Tribal Lawyer As Sovereignty Warriors, 6 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 7, 13–14 (1997).
174. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 150, at 1178.
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years of hindsight. One way to transform the field with indigenous
perspectives is to rely on indigenous lawyers, who often do have the
community ties, cultural knowledge, and worldviews that enable them to
bridge Anglo-American and tribal law.
Robert B. Porter once opined:
Suffice it to say, I cannot imagine a time when there has been a greater
need for tribal lawyers. . . .
To fight these sovereignty battles, we need good, strong lawyers in the
trenches—our sovereignty warriors. . . .
....
In my view, it is extremely important that more native people,
especially those from reservation communities, enter the legal profession
and become tribal lawyers. . . . Native People have a knowledge of their
community that no other person does.175

To be clear, we are not suggesting that only Native Americans are
competent to represent tribes, or that by virtue of being a Native American
one is inherently better positioned to represent tribes. Indeed, just as “[a]
lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to
handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar,” and a
“lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through
necessary study,”176 all lawyers may acquire the necessary cultural
competence to represent tribes. In particular, non-Indian attorneys or Indian
attorneys who are representing a tribe other than their own may learn the
relevant cultural knowhow to competently represent their clients.177 Our
point is that nothing in Rule 1.1 suggests or alerts lawyers to that need, and
the legalistic training and indoctrination of lawyers indeed discourages if
not excludes the acquisition of such knowledge.
Consider the late Navajo attorney and judge Claudeen Bates Arthur’s
admonition to address difficult questions by envisioning the role of the
lawyer though Navajo worldview. That worldview can probably only be
completely accessed by individuals who are brought up with that cultural
training, have resided within the sacred homeland of the Navajos, and know
their kinship relations through the Navajo clan system. Today, the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court has a choice of law rule dictating that the court must
defer to Navajo law over state or federal law whenever possible.178 While
175. Porter, supra note 173, at 13–14.
176. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2012).
177. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 142, 152 n.439 (2000).
178. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 204(A)–(B) (“In all cases the courts of the
Navajo Nation shall first apply applicable Navajo Nation statutory laws and regulations to
resolve matters in dispute before the courts.
The Courts shall utilize Diné bi
beenahhaz’áanii (Navajo Traditional, Customary, Natural or Common Law) to guide the
interpretation of Navajo Nation statutory laws and regulations. The courts shall also utilize
Diné bi beenahaz’áanii whenever Navajo Nation statutes or regulations are silent on matters
in dispute before the courts.”). Justice Ray Austin explains,
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much of this law is available in codified written form, other Navajo law
remains in the customary practices and oral tradition of the people.179
Navajo attorneys and others who have become knowledgeable about
Navajo law, culture, and community are likely to be the advocates with
competence on these matters.
It seems certain that many tribal lawyers grasp what is at stake for their
clients and accept the responsibility to practice with respect for their
cultures and traditions. As Dale White has noted, “[W]e should always
remember who is affected by our work. Long after we attorneys have done
our work, picked up our papers, closed up our briefcase, and gone home,
the tribe and its members will still be there. We must never forget that
fact.”180 Indian lawyers, such as Raymond Cross, have articulated their
understanding of such concepts as the wouncage, or Sacred Trust, “an
expression of the communal reverence shown by the people of a tribe or
community for the originating force that makes the wind, that brings the
clouds, that carries the rain, that falls to the grass, that feeds the buffalo to
nourish the man.”181 Tribal lawyers keeping such concepts in mind as an
overarching discipline are potentially some of the strongest advocates for
tribal communities, advocates who retain their connection to the
community, able to step into the non-Indian legal and political world to
effectively speak for the community.

In addition to explicit authorization, the choice of law statute determines the order
by which the court applies the laws. The Navajo statute requires that the Navajo
Nation courts first apply Navajo statutory laws and regulations and then Navajo
common law, if a statutory law does not address the issue. Navajo common law
can be used to interpret Navajo statutory laws and non-Navajo laws. Next, the
Navajo Nation courts can resort to ‘applicable federal laws or regulations’ in the
absence of applicable Navajo law. Last in the order of preference is state law.
Raymond D. Austin, American Indian Customary Law in the Modern Courts of American
Indian Nations, 11 WYO. L. REV. 351, 362–63 (2011).
179. There is also the related question of language ability. It is certainly not the case that
one must be fluent in a tribal language to represent a tribe; indeed, many tribal members and
leaders do not speak their tribal languages. On the other hand, the revitalization of tribal law
often requires research into tribal customary law, which exists in the unique language of the
tribe. The Navajo Supreme Court, for example, often publishes passages of court opinions
in Navajo, particularly when it cites to the Navajo Fundamental Law. Concepts such as “ke”
or “hozho,” which are critical to Navajo dispute resolution do not translate perfectly into
English. Additionally, on a practical level, some tribal clients—whether individuals or the
entire tribal council—may prefer to conduct legal business in the Native language. Ann
Kelly, Kickapoo Tribal Council To Meet (Jan. 15, 2004), http://newsok.com/kickapoo-tribalcouncil-to-meet/article/1885792 (discussing complaints that surfaced when the Kickapoo
Tribal Council conducted budget meetings in Kickapoo, which some members of the
community could not understand). In both of these ways, ascertaining customary law and
representing Native language speakers, the tribal lawyer with Native language familiarity
may have a qualification that is extremely important to the reform and decolonization of
tribal law.
180. White, supra note 104, at 510.
181. Fletcher, supra note 34, at 236 (citing PAUL VANDEVELDER, COYOTE WARRIOR: ONE
MAN, THREE TRIBES, AND THE TRIAL THAT FORGED A NATION 244 (2004) (paraphrasing
Raymond Cross).
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Next, tribal leaders and scholars alike agree that some of the most
important work in tribal lawyering is in the project of legal reform and
institution building. As Matthew Fletcher has argued, “[T]he days of
making pie-in-the-sky arguments in federal court—and winning—are
behind us. There has to be another method of preserving and enhancing
Indian and Indian tribal rights than pounding down the courthouse door. It
is these strategies that Indian lawyers can assist more than any others.”182
In addition to their work “on the front lines” of major litigation, Fletcher
argues, tribal lawyers are critically involved in “the development of tribal
law and political structures.”183
During the era of self-determination, tribes are reclaiming historic
governing functions and updating them consistent with contemporary
circumstances.184 Tribal lawyers may be deeply involved in constitutional
reform, setting up court systems and drafting or revising tribal codes. Many
current needs directly reflect changes occurring in the self-determination
era. Since 1988, tribes have been able to contract with the federal
government to administer their own federally funded hospitals, schools, and
other programs. They also may be eligible to assume increased regulatory
powers over natural resources and environmental regulation within their
reservations.185 As a result of the 2010 passage of the Tribal Law and
Order Act, tribes are revising their criminal codes to provide for increased
sentences and procedural safeguards for defendants.186
To these institution-building tasks, tribal lawyers bring important skills
of policy analysis, legislative drafting, constitutional and statutory
interpretation, contract preparation, and so on. Notably, however, these
skills are precisely those that conventional legal education—focused on the
case method—may be the least likely to address. Moreover, as accounts of
tribal constitutional reform suggest, much of the initiative draws from the
will of the people as much as the input of legal professionals.187 Still, tribal
182. See id. at 234–35.
183. Id. at 235.
184. See, e.g., Keith Steven Richotte, Jr., “We the Indians of the Turtle Mountain
Reservation . . .”:
Rethinking Tribal Constitutionalism Beyond the
Colonialist/Revolutionary Dialectic (June 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Minnesota), available at http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/54709/1/RichotteJr_umn_
0130E_10395.pdf.
185. For example, Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) in 1986 and
the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1987, providing the Environmental Protection Agency with
the authority to treat “Tribes as States” and regulate water quality within the reservation.
186. See, e.g., HOPI CODE pmbl. (2012), http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/LinkClick.aspx?file
ticket=Mdd%2BgJeO1Rk%3D&tabid=169 (“This Hopi Code is established by the Hopi
Council in order to ensure that those who violate the rights of the Hopi people to live in a
peaceful, crime-free environment are appropriately removed from our Villages and
rehabilitated before they are allowed to return. Respect for the rights of others is a basic
tenet of the Hopi way of life. It is further the intent of this Hopi Code to adopt the essential
provisions of the United States Government’s Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010.”).
187. See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF
NATIVE NATIONS 83–104, 272–86, 323–33 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006) (including first-person
testimony of tribal citizens involved in constitutional reform).
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attorneys are likely to have more training in these skills than others in tribal
government or communities, and will often be called on, for example, to
assist in constitutional reform or tribal code drafting.188
To be effective in tribal legal reform in an era of self-determination,
tribal lawyers must be mindful of the relationship between tribal culture and
government, and the ascendant norm of revitalizing tribal customary law for
contemporary contexts.189 And it is here again that the lawyer’s
competence, as defined by Rule 1.1, must include—but regrettably does not
incorporate—not only facility with legal institution building but also
knowledge about, and respect for, the particular tribal culture. As the
Pueblo lawyer and law professor Christine Zuni Cruz has put it, those who
seek to work with tribal people must seek “cultural literacy,” including the
ability to “critically analyze the social and political structures that inform
. . . realities.”190 Given the interrelationship of law and culture,
a grasp of indigenous knowledge systems, relationships, beliefs,
expressions, values, and an understanding of one’s own as well the
dominant cultural milieu (as they are at odds with or in sync with the
culture one is working with) are important to cultural literacy.
At the heart of cultural literacy in respect to indigenous peoples is an
understanding of indigenous knowledge. Familiarity with the indigenous
legal tradition, as an aspect of that knowledge, is important to lawyers
involved in the representation of indigenous peoples and indigenous
nations. The link between indigenous legal tradition and the operation of
law and justice within indigenous communities cannot be ignored in the
internal practice of law, even if the fact that an indigenous legal tradition
exists and is important to study has been ignored by most legal
institutions in the country. The identification of the indigenous legal
tradition as one of the seven most important legal traditions of the world
proves that not all, however, are blind to its importance and
pervasiveness.191

While Professor Zuni Cruz has written evocatively about the professional
aspects of representing both individual and tribal clients,192 her words here
have special resonance for the work of the tribal attorney in internal legal
reform.193 Her comments also support current thinking in effective norms
188. TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANDS OF N.D., CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION AND REVISION PROCESS 2001–2002 (Jerilyn DeCoteau ed., 2003) (on file with
the author).
189. AUSTIN, supra note 24, at xvii.
190. Christine Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy and Ethic of Law/Lawyering for
Indigenous Peoples, 82 N.D. L. REV. 863, 892 (2006) (quoting DONALDO MACEDO,
LITERACIES OF POWER, WHAT AMERICANS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO KNOW 17 (2006)).
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back in: Community Lawyering in
Indigenous Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557, 574 (1999) (“While an individual’s
relationship to her community may be a close and integral one or a complicated and distant
one, an attorney must consider its nature in order to understand the client decisions.”).
193. See also Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law As Indigenous Social Reality and Separate
Consciousness [Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, 1 TRIBAL L.J. 1
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of tribal governance, based as they are on the notion of congruency between
traditional tribal culture and contemporary institutional organization.
Political economists Joe Kalt and Stephen Cornell coined the term
“cultural match” to describe a contemporary tribal government whose
structure and values sufficiently correspond with traditional norms to make
it functional.194 As a diagnostic tool, the concept of cultural match is very
helpful in explaining why certain forms of government do not work for
certain tribes—for example, a model of centralized government with a
singular powerful head of state will often present problems for a tribe
maintaining a tradition of decentralized, local leadership held by multiple
family groups. Even with this insight, however, it is difficult to turn to the
challenge of what Kalt and Cornell call “nation building” or the actual work
of building institutions that will simultaneously reflect the traditional values
of tribes and function in a changing and modern society.
It is precisely in this most sensitive of functions—the decolonization of
tribal law and the reassertion of tribal culture—that tribal lawyers may
bring the most to the table. But how can they do it? Several tribal lawyers
and scholars provide some ideas. Robert Porter, a Seneca lawyer and law
professor who recently served as President of the Seneca Nation, and then
joined an international law firm in New York,195 has long argued for tribal
lawyers to revitalize tribal law consistent with tribal traditions. As he
writes: “[T]ribal lawyers are in a critical position to influence the
redeveloping of tribal sovereignty through the redevelopment of the tribal
legal, governmental, and political infrastructure. To me, tribal lawyers
must be sovereignty warriors if the Indian nations are to survive.”196 As
one might expect about the work of a “warrior,” the lawyer’s task is not
easy here. Porter explains, “While the tribal client must initiate efforts to
revise and reform tribal societies, it is the tribal lawyer who usually does
the heavy lifting in terms of effectuating the details of these initiatives.”197
This heavy lifting requires the tribal lawyer to be particularly attentive to
certain risks and in some ways to depart from conventional legal training.
As Porter articulates:
If the tribal lawyer does nothing other than, for example, borrow the state
domestic relations law when drafting the tribal domestic relations law, the
lawyer is doing nothing other than advising the tribe to replicate itself in
the image of the dominant society. . . . Because of the way lawyers are
(2001), available at http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz /index
.php (arguing that tribal sovereignty is strengthened when the laws of an indigenous nation
are based on internalized values and norms).
194. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances
of Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO?:
STRATEGIES IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 17–21 (Stephen Cornell &
Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1995).
195. See Robert Odawi Porter, Senior Counsel, SNR DENTON, http://www.snrdenton
.com/people/p/porter_robert.aspx.
196. Porter, supra note 173, at 13.
197. Id. at 12.
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trained, this mistake can be easily made. Going to a book answer—a
book of state laws—is what the Anglo-American-trained lawyers are
taught. Mindlessly borrowing state laws, especially laws governing social
behavior, can, in my view, be the equivalent of the forced assimilation
efforts to destroy tribal societies seen in the nineteenth century. The
difference here is that it is self-induced and perpetually reinforcing, rather
than externally imposed.198

To realize the potential of decolonization in the law reform process, Porter
urges that:
[T]ribal lawyers should have an added professional obligation to their
clients, in addition to their advocating, counseling, and negotiation
functions. This obligation is the obligation to help heal the injustice and
wrong-doing, the broken social, legal, political, and economic systems
within our communities, and the injuries inflicted by colonization.199

Such “added professional obligations” must include, we believe, a
commitment to developing cultural competence and cultural literacy far
greater than the legal competency imagined by Rule 1.1.
If Porter identifies a key role for tribal lawyers in the process of
institution building—counseling clients about decolonizing and healing
measures in law reform—other scholars provide guidance about the
underlying philosophical and substantive content of tribal law reform.
Professor Duane Champagne notes that for many tribes, there will be
resistance to any reform and changes may be modest.200 Traditional tribal
governance may have severely eroded over the generations, such that it is
not possible to recover it.201 Moreover, traditional institutions may not
have the capacity or orientation to deal with the market economy or national
polity.202 Indeed, as Keith Richotte points out, tribal advocates may not be
serving their clients well if they project an irreconcilable conflict between
“traditional” and “colonial” government.203 The modern reality of most
tribes requires advocates to embrace legal pluralism and the possibility of
multiple, contested meanings.204
Some tribes will retain their existing constitutions or codes as a base and
the lawyer may be constrained to suggesting the places where the tribe is
able to make certain provisions more reflective of tribal culture, remove
198. Id.
199. Id. at 13.
200. See Duane Champagne, Remaking Tribal Constitutions: Meeting the Challenges of
Tradition, Colonialism, and Globalization, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM,
supra note 187; see also VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN:
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 19 (1984) (“It is important to
recognize that, given the decades of erosion traditional cultures have suffered and the
scarcity of viable alternatives available in the twentieth century, the present organization of
tribal governments is not necessarily an unreasonable compromise between what might have
been and what was possible to accept.”).
201. Champagne, supra note 200, at 13–34.
202. See id. at 12.
203. Richotte, supra note 184.
204. Id. at 176.
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federal influence, or simply to improve administration.205 Other tribes may
attempt more comprehensive reform, for example through a constitutional
convention,206 or the creation of new institutions such as Peacemaker
Courts or Elders Council for dispute resolution and juvenile matters.
Professors Matthew Fletcher and John Borrows have written about the
challenges and opportunities of uncovering tribal customary law.207 Putting
a fine point on the skill set, Justice Ray Austin of the Navajo Supreme
Court writes:
[T]here is a unique side to tribal court jurisprudence in the United States
. . . [that] involves retrieving ancient tribal values, customs, and norms
and using them to solve contemporary legal issues. . . . The modern
Navajo Nation courts are adept at this way of problem solving. This
method is itself a lesson embedded in the Navajo Creation Scripture and
Journey Narratives. These narratives are the Navajo people’s oral history
beginning with the primeval universe.208

Similarly, according to Claudeen Bates Arthur, the use of tribal customary
law is key to survival as distinct peoples:
I believe we must preserve the fundamental, internal essence of tribal
identity. Tribes must decide for themselves what is important for their
survival as tribal people. For the Navajo people, these are the
fundamental philosophy and laws ordained by the Holy People, which are
those concepts that remain unchanged despite the intrusions from outside
and those things that were there when we came to our homeland between
the four sacred mountains.209

The question of how the tribal lawyer should help the tribe pursue
cultural revitalization may seem to fall outside of the scope of Rule 1.1. It
may appear to be very “complicated,” Arthur wrote, “but if I react to this
task as a Navajo person, as a Native thinker, the answer is simple.”210 The
Navajo worldview orients along the four directions and provides guidance
about how to approach each cycle of the day or of life, from origins in the
east, to planning in the south, to living in the west, to hope, faith, and
restoration in the north. Having focused for so long on survival, the Navajo
people, including their leaders, have not adequately moved into the
205. Champagne, supra note 200, at 13–31.
206. Eric Lemont, Overcoming the Politics of Reform: The Story of the Cherokee Nation
Constitutional Convention, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 187,
at 287 (describing the 1999 Constitutional Convention of the Cherokee Nation).
207. Compare BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA, supra note 152, at xii (“[T]he power of
Aboriginal law can still be discerned despite the pervasiveness of imported law.”), with
BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION, supra note 152, at 23–55 (describing
sources and categories of indigenous law including sacred, natural, deliberative, positivistic,
and customary), Fletcher, Looking to the East, supra note 146, Fletcher, Rethinking
Customary Law, supra note 146, and Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War,
supra note 146.
208. AUSTIN, supra note 24, at xvii.
209. Claudeen Bates Arthur, The Role of the Tribal Attorney, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 21, 23
(2002).
210. Id.
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planning and execution phases—for example, in the preservation of
sovereignty and culture. Tribal lawyers here have a particular role to play.
As Bates recounts:
Many times lawyers for tribes take on roles of leadership because they are
perceived as having knowledge. And yes, they do have knowledge; they
are trained in the ways of the outside world and can deal with external
issues for tribes. But lawyers are often asked to provide leadership on
internal matters. The word for “leader” in Navajo is Nataanii. But the
word means more than just leadership in political circles; the word
embodies the idea that the person referenced is also a spiritual individual.
Nataanii were individuals who had lived life and become wise. They
were people with integrity. They had gone through the four-step process
over and over again, around and around the circle, building each time on
previous experience, and because of this could guide and plan for the
survival of the community. Therefore, Indian tribal lawyers, if they are
truly to function as leaders of tribal governments, must be wise, spiritual
people because tribes are depending upon them for their very survival.211

One hopes, she writes, that they are “spiritual people of unquestioned
integrity fully remembering the internal tribal concepts that are fundamental
to the survival of the tribe.”212 Of course this prescription, as Arthur notes,
goes straight to questions of identity and authority, issues that we discuss
next.
2. Allocation of Authority Between Client and Attorney
Rule 1.2(a) vests in clients, as opposed to lawyers, the sole authority to
determine the goals of the representation. The rule states in relevant part
that, “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives
of representation.”213 The rule further empowers clients to participate in
selecting the means by which their objectives are to be achieved, noting that
[a lawyer] “shall consult with the client as to the means by which [goals]
are to be pursued.”214 Comment 1 explains, “Paragraph (a) confers upon
the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by
legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer’s
professional obligations.”215
Such lofty language, reflecting the emphasis of individual autonomy in
lawyers’ professional ideology, is a far cry from common practice realities
in the representation of tribes. As scholars have suggested in their analysis
of IRA approved governments, Rule 1.2 notwithstanding, it was the Crow
and Hopi tribal lawyers who exercised enormous power over the tribes they
represented, not the tribes who controlled the objectives or their lawyers.216
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. at 25.
MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012).
Id.
Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 1.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, in ICC litigation, tribes often believed they were pursuing the
objective of land restitution, while their lawyers were filing claims for
monetary remedies, a clear violation of Rule 1.2.217
Moreover, the compounded effect of the interplay of various individually
inspired rules is evident in the relationship of Rules 1.1 and 1.2 and their
harmful impact for group clients. The now-classic example of the
usurpation of the Sioux Nation’s authority per Rule 1.2(a) in the litigation
involving the Black Hills by lawyers who sought, and by a justice system
that allowed for, damages rather than preservation of the sacred land was
enabled by the definition of competency in Rule 1.1. There, the lawyers
seeking damages on behalf of the clients may have been legally competent,
yet their failure to appreciate the admittedly complex, and perhaps even
evolving, cultural and political norms of their clients led them to pursue a
legal strategy that their clients’ ultimately perceived as disempowering and
indeed devastating to their future as Lakota and Dakota peoples.218
Consider comment 2 to Rule 1.2, which states in relevant part that:
On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the
means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. Clients normally
defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the
means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect
to technical, legal and tactical matters.219

Client deference to the “special knowledge and skill of their lawyer”
makes ample sense when the relevant knowledge in question is legal, but
makes little sense when the relevant knowledge is cultural of which the
lawyers are ignorant. One might have expected the comment to instruct
lawyers to defer to clients on such matters, but the comment unfortunately
obscures and even forecloses analysis of this delicate issue. It states,
“Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as
the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be
adversely affected.”220 The very example given by the comment, deference
to clients on issues of expenses to be incurred, is revealing: it eliminates
the space for a meaningful conversation about the actual goals of the
clients.
The risks of attorney paternalism, usurpation of clients’ authority, and
factors of racial subordination and cultural misunderstanding that contribute
to these problems are, of course, not unique to the representation of groups
217. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
218. Thirty-two years after the decision in Sioux Nation, and with the award in that case
still sitting in a U.S. Treasury account, a young Lakota lawyer named Chase Iron Eyes was
involved in a social media campaign to raise $9 million dollars to enable the Great Sioux
Nation to recover a small portion of the Black Hills that was being sold by a private rancher.
See Christina Rose, Pe Sla Purchase Guarantees Sacred Land Will Be Used for Ceremonies,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 21, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
article/pe%E2%80%99-sla-purchase-guarantees-sacred-land-will-be-used-ceremonies146500.
219. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2012).
220. Id.
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such as tribes.221 A rich body of literature calls upon lawyers to engage in
“client-centered” representation, listen and defer to clients’ actual goals and
avoid imputing goals to clients they do not actually seek.222 Yet two unique
features of group-representation are worth highlighting here. First, calls for
client-centered representation have sometimes, and increasingly so recently,
been hijacked by advocates of zealous client autonomy and naked pursuit of
self-interest.223 In the case of tribes, the risk is replacing one set of imputed
goals—paternalistic goals determined by lawyers rather than clients—with
another set of imputed goals—attributing to tribes the desire to pursue
naked self-interest rather than objectives possibly shaped by different
cultural norms.
Second, the extent and gravity of usurping clients’ goals may be of a
different and perhaps greater magnitude in the representation of groups such
as tribes compared to the representation of individuals in other contexts.
Lawyers engaged in the decolonization of tribal law and the reassertion of
tribal culture, in self-determination projects of groups, and in institution
building for people owe a special, particular duty to the people they
represent. As Professor Porter notes, exactly because of the power
exercised by tribal lawyers effectuating the details of representation,
lawyers must defer to the authority of their group-clients on such matters.
Tribal lawyers, argues Porter, “should have an added professional
obligation to their clients . . . to help heal the injustice and wrong-doing, the
broken social, legal, political, and economic systems within our
communities.”224
Next, building on the near fetish of individualism and the exercise of
autonomy by clients, Rule 1.2(b) complements Rule 1.2(a) by stating the
nonaccountability principle: “A lawyer’s representation of a client,
including representation by appointment, does not constitute an
endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or
activities.”225 Comment 5 adds that, “representing a client does not
constitute approval of the client’s views or activities.”226 In the context of
representing empowered individuals, Rule 1.2(b) conveys (more) sensibly
that, because it is the client, and the client alone, who determines the goals
of the representation, a lawyer is not morally or otherwise accountable for
the objectives he or she helps the client pursue. In the context of

221. Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in ClientCentered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 391 (1997) (“Lawyers limit the
client’s legal options both by devaluing racial components of a client’s legal claim and
through cultural ignorance.”).
222. See generally William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs.
Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991); Wald, supra note 130, at 914–16; Eli Wald,
Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L.
REV. 747 (2008).
223. Pearce & Wald, supra note 135, at 25–39.
224. Porter, supra note 173, at 13.
225. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2012).
226. Id. cmt. 5.
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representing groups such as tribes, however, Rule 1.2(b) is far from
intuitive or inevitable. Asserting moral distance from a client seems
sensible and appropriate when the subject matter of representation is
litigation or business negotiation. It is not as compelling in the case of a
lawyer who is engaged in helping clients pursue projects such as cultural
revitalization.227
Rule 1.2(c) appears at first relevant to mitigating these issues of moral
distance and accountability. It states that “[a] lawyer may limit the scope of
the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances
and the client gives informed consent.”228 The rule seems to allow tribal
lawyers, especially outside counsel, to attempt to limit the scope of
representation to a particular litigation or business transaction rather than to
broader nation building and self-determination. Yet while such a technical
subsection may risk masking the complex true nature of representation of
tribes, it cannot resolve the real challenges inherent in the representation.
Even if a contemporary William Wirt could have written a limited scope
representation clause into his retainer with the Cherokees in cases such as
Cherokee Nation, such a clause would not and could not change the fact
that by recognizing the power of the Supreme Court over tribes, the lawyer
(and his client) has implicated not only the Cherokee Nation’s own moral,
cultural, and sovereignty claims but also the claims of all other Indian tribes
that may be bound by newly announced rules of Indian law.
Indeed, Rule 1.2(c) seems to forbid such a use of the Rules. The Rule
itself conditions limited scope representation upon informed client consent,
which tribes may very well refuse to grant in these circumstances.
Moreover, comment 7 states that “although this Rule affords the lawyer and
client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be
reasonable under the circumstances,” and adds that “[a]lthough an
agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the
duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be
considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
The
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”229
comment’s cross-reference to Rule 1.1 is ironic: a limited scope
representation would be a relevant factor in assessing a tribal lawyer’s
competence if and only if Rule 1.1’s conception of competence included
competence about tribal culture, history, and political organization. It is
difficult to imagine the tribal representation—even the most sophisticated
financial lending arrangement, for example—that would not invoke, at least
to some degree, these factors.

227. Arthur, supra note 209, at 23.
228. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c).
229. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 7.
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3. Conflicts of Interest
Rule 1.7 aims to protect attorney loyalty to clients by forbidding lawyers
from representing clients when the attorney-client relationship is tainted by
a conflict of interest. Rule 1.7(a) states that a “lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest,” and
goes on to define a “concurrent conflict of interest” in terms of “directly
adverse” clients,230 or in circumstances in which the representation of one
client gives rise to “a significant risk” of a “material[] limit[ation]”
regarding the representation of another client, “a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”231 Rule 1.8 applies the
conflict rule in common fact patterns,232 and Rule 1.9 defines and forbids
conflicts vis-à-vis former clients.233 If a conflict of interest arises, the Rules
generally allow a client to cure the defect by giving informed consent to the
conflict.234 Comment 1 explains, “Loyalty and independent judgment are
essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client,” and comment 6
adds that
[t]he client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to
feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is
likely to impair the lawyer’s ability to represent the client effectively. In
addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is
undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client’s
case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the
representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s interest in
retaining the current client.

Yet the Rules only demand that lawyers avoid legal conflicts of interest
as defined by Rules 1.7–1.9 and do not preclude representations tainted by
other types of conflicts. For example, comment 6 states that: “On the other
hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose
interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of
competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily
constitute a conflict of interest . . . ,”235 and comment 24 generally allows
lawyers to represent clients with positional and ideological conflicts of
interest, stating that a lawyer may
take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on
behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position
on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a
client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a
conflict of interest.236

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. R. 1.7(a)(1).
Id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
Id. R. 1.8.
Id. R. 1.9.
Id. R. 1.7(b)(4), 1.9(a).
Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
Comment 24 does note,
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The Rules’ defense of attorney loyalty to clients in terms of disallowing
representations tainted by legal conflicts of interest affords group clients—
tribes included—some protection, although the narrow reach of the Rules
did not preclude the non-Indian lawyers for the Sioux Nation from
collecting their contingency fees while their clients remained poor and
dissatisfied with the resolution of the case.237
More importantly, however, the Rules’ focus on legal conflicts to the
exclusion of positional, ideological, or other types of conflicts obscures
some important questions related to the representation of tribes. As
S. James Anaya wrote with respect to his work in Nevada v. Hicks, tribal
lawyers face a number of challenging conflicts questions in tribal
representation.238 As Anaya put it, “[H]ow do we advise our Indian or
tribal clients when we see Federal Indian Law, which was once understood
to be a friendly body of doctrine, being emasculated by the federal courts to
the detriment of tribal interests?”239 There are a number of specific
implications of this problem, which go to questions of client goals and
identity under Rules 1.2 and 1.7.
First, what to do when the tribal client expects and deserves his day in
court, but the lawyer knows that the case, if it ends up in the Supreme
Court, has a 70 to 80 percent chance of losing (or worse)?240 Should the
tribal attorney counsel his client to expend precious resources on the very
slim chance of vindicating tribal sovereignty and property? Second, and
relatedly, should the attorney counsel the client about the ramifications for
other tribes? In each of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisdiction cases, the
situation for the tribes has gotten progressively worse, and the tribal lawyer
can now probably predict that his client’s interests may set a precedent with
harmful results for the other 565 tribes. How, if at all, should that
information affect the lawyer’s advice about strategy? Third, what should
A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s
action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer’s effectiveness in
representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision
favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position
taken on behalf of the other client.
Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 24.
237. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
238. See S. James Anaya, The Ethical Dilemma of Doing Federal Indian Law, Paper
Delivered to the Federal Bar Association’s Annual Indian Law Conference (Apr. 4–5, 2002)
(on file with the authors).
239. See id.
240. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of
States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280–81
(2001) (“Beyond the departures from settled law, the cases [from the mid-1980s through the
October 2000 Term] show a stunning record of losses for Indians. Tribal interests have lost
about 77% of all the Indian cases decided by the Rehnquist Court in its fifteen terms, and
82% of the cases decided by the Supreme Court in the last ten terms. This dismal track
record stands in contrast to the record tribal interests chalked up in the Burger years, when
they won 58% of their Supreme Court cases. It would be difficult to find a field of law or a
type of litigant that fares worse than Indians do in the Rehnquist Court. Convicted criminals
achieved reversals in 36% of all cases that reached the Supreme Court in the same period,
compared to the tribes’ 23% success rate.” (footnotes omitted)).
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the tribal lawyer do when the “best” precedents—often, in jurisdiction
cases, the Supreme Court’s historic decisions in Cherokee Nation and
Worcester—are cloaked in racist language and discriminatory reasoning
now abhorrent to the tribal client and indeed most of American society?
Or, as Anaya put it, how should the lawyer assess the “difficult choices
presented by the effort to advance tribal interests within a body of law that
rests on problematic, if not illegitimate, doctrinal tenets”?241 These already
complex challenges are further complicated by the fact that tribal clients are
not insulated from the dominant culture of aggressive individualism and
narrow pursuit of self-interest, let alone America’s love affair with
litigation, such that a tribal attorney who does bring these issues to the
attention of clients may be dismissed or ignored.
Rule 1.7, to be sure, offers some limited guidance regarding these
questions. In assessing whether positional conflicts amount to prohibited
legal conflicts of interest, comment 24 to Rule 1.7 states:
Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of
the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is
substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters,
the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of
the clients involved and the clients’ reasonable expectations in retaining
the lawyer.242

Note, however, that a tribal lawyer would only be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests pursuant to comment 24 if both tribes
were current clients, and even then the “significance of the issue to the
immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved” would be but
“relevant factors.” Similarly, comment 26 notes that
conflicts of interest . . . arise in contexts other than litigation . . . [and]
[r]elevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for
material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer’s
relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being
performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and
the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often
one of proximity and degree.243

The analysis is instructive but limited in scope: it directs a lawyer’s
attention only to current representations of clients and focuses on the
likelihood of legal disagreements.
Our concern with Rule 1.7 as it pertains to the representation of tribes is
that it may lead lawyers to a quick resolution that no conflict limits their
representation of tribes, and worse will foreclose the space for any
meaningful discussion of the impact of litigation strategy and precedent on
other tribes for the formalistic and unpersuasive reason that such other
241. See Anaya, supra note 238, at 3 (“[H]ow do we advise our Indian or tribal clients
when we see Federal Indian Law, which was once understood to be a friendly body of
doctrine, being emasculated by the federal courts to the detriment of tribal interests.”).
242. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 24 (2012) (emphasis added).
243. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 26 (emphasis added).
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tribes are not the lawyer’s client. Moreover, nothing in the Rules’ approach
even suggests analysis of the impact on future tribal generations or the
impact on culture, tradition, or relationships.
Tribal advocacy
organizations, such as the Native American Rights Fund and National
Congress of American Indians, have developed programs to track Indian
law cases and provide strategic advice including the likelihood of success,
impacts on other tribes, and framing of the claims—with an eye to assisting
in particular cases and preserving tribal sovereignty more broadly.244 Yet
there is little in the Rules to guide such efforts.
Consider litigation settlement. Settlement often requires tribes to
compromise on some of the rights and values held most dearly by the tribal
membership. As Susan Williams has written about in her work on water
law settlements, there may well be constituencies among the tribe for whom
water is a sacred element whose value transcends quantification or
distribution in property terms.245 In land claims and treaty cases, rights
promised by the United States generations ago have often motivated tribal
advocacy for generations and there can be a real loss—culturally and
politically—associated with relinquishing historical claims.246 For all of
these reasons, the tribal attorney may find it challenging to counsel his or
her clients about settling major claims—challenges about which Rule 1.7
and its legalistic approach to conflicts are silent.
Implementation of settlements can also be difficult. A much-heralded
example of successful tribal-federal negotiation is in the recent resolution of
claims that the Department of the Interior had mismanaged tribal trust fund
accounts going back to the allotment era.247 The United States agreed to
pay forty-two tribes over one billion dollars to resolve these claims.
Individual tribes, some of which were represented by individual counsel
and others by NARF, received major monetary awards. These settlements
brought some closure on claims that had been a major stain on the federaltribal relationship and some vindication for the tribes that had been raising
the issue for so long. But when those awards reached the tribal
communities, questions arose about how to use the money. Some tribal
leaders who tried to implement tribal values about collective welfare and
planning for future generations lost their jobs, or were pressured to release
244. See Richard Guest, Tribal Supreme Court Project, NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND,
http://www.narf.org/cases/supctproj.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
245. See, e.g., Susan Williams, Missouri River Dialogue: Tribal and Conservationist
Perspectives, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 35, 36 (2002). Susan Williams, a member
of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota Nation, is well known as a leading tribal lawyer in the
Indian water law field. She successfully argued the Big Horn River water adjudication
before the U.S. Supreme Court and has counseled tribes on numerous water rights
settlements. See also Susan Williams, Indian Winters Water Rights Administration:
Averting New War, 11 PUB. LAND L. REV. 53 (1990).
246. See Carlson, supra note 81 (analyzing why the Sioux Nation has repeatedly rejected
over $1 billion dollars in compensation for land taken by the United States over 100 years
ago).
247. Judge Approves $3.4 Billion in Indian Royalties Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2011, at A18.
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the funds on a per capita basis to individuals.248 Tribal attorneys may find
themselves caught in the middle.249 In addition to the upheaval in certain
tribes, the trust fund settlement has also inspired a dispute over fees among
tribal lawyers who represented tribes at various stages in the litigation.250
Yet, difficulties in implementation and postsettlement fees do not obscure
the fact that tribal attorneys achieved a victory of monumental proportions
in the tribal trust fund cases. Despite the limits of the U.S. legal system in
providing real justice or healing for Indian people, tribal lawyers continue
to push in this direction, often heroically so.
Or consider the increased involvement of tribes in business dealings to
raise revenues for essential governmental functions like police and safety
services, administration, and regulation.251 While in-house tribal counsel
may engineer and execute these deals, it is also true that tribes sometimes
hire outside counsel, particularly for complex lending and financial matters.
At least two major sets of ethical issues arise in these kinds of dealings,
both of which evoke the issue of client “loyalty” not envisioned or
addressed by the conflict rules. In the first instance, tribal attorneys are
under considerable pressure to structure tribal law and contracts in a way
that both attracts outside investment and respects internal norms. Tribal
codes are often not well developed, and this kind of work may be a
threshold requirement, pushed by tribal leaders and outside business
partners alike. In the rush to create an environment conducive to business,
tribes may adopt foreign commercial codes without sufficient attention to
existing law or tribal values.252
In contract negotiations, moreover, investors and other partners often
want tribes to waive their sovereign immunity as a condition of the
transaction, and the tribal attorney must guide her client through these
nuanced considerations. On the one hand, the waiver of sovereign
immunity can be difficult or unappealing for tribal members concerned
about the limited resources and survival of the tribe itself,253 and on the
248. See Heather Scofield, Business Director Says Settlement Could Help Tribe’s
Financial Future, DURANGO HERALD (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.durangoherald.com/
article/20120424/NEWS01/704249922/Business-director-says-settlement-could-helptribe%E2%80%99s-financial-future.
249. See Jim Mimiaga, Ute Mountain Utes Get Their Long-Awaited Checks, FOUR
CORNERS FREE PRESS (Sept. 27, 2012), http://fourcornersfreepress.com/?p=829 (“[L]ast
month the tribal council agreed to pay out the money to individuals. [The] tribal council
attorney . . . would only say, ‘They listened to the people.’”).
250. See Ron Capriccioso, Native American Rights Fund Fires Back at Cobell Lawyers
Over Fees, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 19, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedia
network.com/2012/09/19/native-american-rights-fund-fires-back-at-cobell-lawyers-overfees-134793.
251. ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
INDIAN COUNTRY (2012).
252. See, e.g., Wenona T. Singel, Cultural Sovereignty and Transplanted Law: Tensions
in Indigenous Self-Rule, 15 KAN J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 358–60 (2005).
253. See, e.g., R. Spencer Clift, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes;
Their Recent Dramatic Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of
Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177,
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other hand, the decision to grant a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity is
itself a sovereign act,254 and one practiced by state and federal governments
on a regular basis.
Other lawyers sometimes struggle with questions about the impact of
dispute resolution and precedent on nonparty group members who may be
similarly situated. Cause lawyers, for example, often worry about strategic
selection of cases for litigation and about the filing of a case by an
individual that may be inconsistent with the cause. Like tribal lawyers,
however, the experience of cause lawyers, who after all inherently represent
causes rather than individuals, serves to demonstrate the shortcomings of
the conflicts rules and the exclusionary force of the narrow scope in terms
of not providing an arena in which important questions about the
representation of groups may be aired.255 Wouncage—Sacred Trust256—
may not be appropriate in all tribal attorney-client relationships, but
conflicts of interest rules that increasingly deem wouncage a foreign
inconceivable concept ill fit group representation, tribes included.
4. Organization As Client
Rule 1.13 is the only instance in which the Rules acknowledge and
attempt to address clients that are not individuals. Subsection 1.13(a) states
that “[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents,”257 but not
these constituencies. But of course, comment 1 acknowledges, “[a]n
organizational client . . . cannot act except through its officers, directors,
employees, shareholders and other constituents,”258 and, therefore, a lawyer
for an organization will practically represent the organizational client by
dealing with its constituencies, which in turn may confuse the
constituencies as to whom the lawyer represents. “In dealing with an
organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or
180 (2003); see also Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or Dependence?
The Practice Value and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 531, 567–68 (1994) (“We have . . . never viewed the casino as anything but a
temporary measure. The casino is not a statement of who we are, but only a means to get us
to where we want to be. We had tried poverty for 200 years, so we decided to try something
else.”). Ray Halbritter is a member of the Oneida Indian Nation who decided to attend law
school after his aunt and uncle died in a house fire on the reservation; the tribe lacked
emergency services and the state did not send theirs. Halbritter used his law degree to
become a tribal leader and work on economic empowerment, a position that requires him to
negotiate contemporary market opportunities including casino gaming with traditional tribal
values about leadership and community. Id. at 560–68.
254. Kristen A. Carpenter & Ray Halbritter, Beyond the Ethnic Umbrella and the Buffalo:
Some Thoughts on American Indian Tribes and Gaming, 5 GAMING L. REV. 311, 315 & n.34
(2001).
255. See Deborah J. Cantrell, Sensational Reports: The Ethical Duty of Cause Lawyers
To Be Competent in Public Advocacy, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 567, 571–74 (2007) (arguing that
cause lawyers must be skilled in “public advocacy campaign[s]”).
256. See supra note 181; infra note 313 and accompanying text.
257. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2012).
258. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 1.
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other constituents,” subsection 1.13(f) states that “a lawyer shall explain the
identity of the client [the organization] when the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the organization’s interests are adverse to
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.”259
While Rule 1.13 primarily contemplates corporate organizations,260 it is
intended to guide the practice of lawyers who represent clients who are not
individuals. Comment 9, for example, states that “the duty defined in this
Rule applies to governmental organizations.”261 Yet applying Rule 1.13 to
organizations other than corporations is easier said than done. In the
context of corporate clients, the application of subsection 1.13(a)—a
corporate lawyer represents the corporation, not its various constituencies
such as the board of directors, the officers, the employees, or the
shareholders—makes ample sense because of two features of the corporate
entity. First, American corporate law defines the only purpose of a forprofit corporation to be profit maximization on behalf of shareholders.
Thus, practically speaking, stating that a corporate lawyer represents the
corporation means that the corporate lawyer’s clear and only role is to help
the corporation pursue profit maximization, and the only remaining
question is who is authorized to speak and act for the corporation in pursuit
of this one goal. Second, American corporate governance law specifies a
clear corporate hierarchy, such that a corporate lawyer knows exactly who
is authorized to speak and act for the corporate client. Indeed, it is exactly
this very hierarchy that subsections 1.13(b) and 1.13(c) rely on in
specifying the duties of the organizational lawyer in going up the corporate
ladder.262
Outside the corporate context, however, Rule 1.13 loses much of its
guiding force. To begin with, without the simplistic definition of the
corporate entity and its only permissible profit maximizing goal, stating that
a lawyer represent the organization and not its constituencies simply serves
to highlight the question of what it means to represent an organization.
Consider the governmental lawyer. Comment 9 acknowledges that:
Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting
obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government
context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. Although in
some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a
branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as
a whole. . . . Thus, when the client is a governmental organization, a
259. Id. R. 1.13(f).
260. Comment 1, for example, states:
Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the
corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally
to unincorporated associations. “Other constituents” as used in this Comment
means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders
held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.
Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 1.
261. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 9.
262. Id. R. 1.13(b), (c).
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different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality
and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public
business is involved.263

Next, many noncorporate organizations lack the clear hierarchy of
corporations, or for that matter, lack any hierarchy at all. In such
circumstances, the issue of who is authorized to speak and act on behalf of
the organization becomes a complicated and complex affair.
Attempting to apply Rule 1.13 to tribal lawyers exemplifies the confusion
the Rules may cause.
A straightforward and commonly accepted
application of subsection 1.13(a) suggests that a tribal attorney represents
the tribe, and not its constituencies, such as the tribal president, chief or
chair, the legislative counsel or other leaders, or tribal members. So far, so
good. But what does it mean to represent the tribe? Unlike a corporation, a
tribe does not have one simple goal such as profit maximization, but a
complex array of possibly conflicting objectives and goals. Moreover, in
the corporate sphere, not only does a clear hierarchy exist, but decisions
made by the authorized constituencies are insulated from scrutiny by the
business judgment rule.264 Accordingly, a corporate lawyer need only
identify the authorized constituency pursuant to the hierarchal structure and
then usually simply follow the instructions given by the constituent, without
having to worry about the legitimacy of the instructions. But in the case of
tribes, the existence of a hierarchal structure may fail to account for other
constituencies or representatives of the tribe—a classic example being that
religious elders or medicine people may be better situated than elected tribal
leaders to handle sacred sites or repatriation matters. In short, the
representation of tribes often entails complex questions regarding what it
means to represent a tribe and who is authorized to speak and act on behalf
of the tribe, questions that a mechanical application of Rule 1.13 simply
cannot resolve.
Consider subsection 1.13(g):
A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization’s
consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the
individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.265

The Rule makes sense in the corporate context. If, for example, the chief
executive officer wishes to have the corporate attorney represent her, the
“appropriate official,” here the board of directors, will give its informed
consent on behalf of the entity or, if the board wishes to be represented by
the corporate attorney, a majority of independent board members will give

263. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 9 (citation omitted).
264. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 12.
265. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g).
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its informed consent.266 But what if the tribal president asks the tribal
attorney to represent him? It is not always clear who can give informed
consent to the representation in the spirit of Rule 1.13(g).
IV. THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAWYERS AS A
MEANS OF QUESTIONING LAWYERING FOR GROUPS
In a thought-provoking article, Phyllis Bernard asks whether the Rules
and the role-morality they embody serve as a suitable foundation for
lawyers engaged in tribal peacemaking.267 Bernard’s inquiry can be
generalized to encompass questioning whether the Standard Conception and
the Rules serve as a useful and legitimate basis for understanding the role
and practices of Native American lawyers, and indeed group lawyers more
generally. Bernard argues that the basic model of legal ethics is premised
on “an overriding ethical obligation to protect her client’s individual
rights—at all costs—against encroachment by the values of the
community.”268 This “individualistic paradigm,” in which the lawyer’s role
is one of a “champion of individual’s rights,”269 may be inconsistent with
the vision of the role of lawyers representing tribes and committed to tribal
peacemaking because the fundamental unit, or client, is not an individual
but a group—a tribe and its values. Bernard then explores whether moving
away from the individual client as a constitutive feature of understanding
the lawyer’s role is consistent with the dominant professional ideology and
the Rules.
Bernard, of course, is not alone in questioning the fit of the
individualistic dominant Standard Conception and the Rules that codify it
as the professional baseline for lawyers representing groups. Scholars and
practitioners representing groups, ranging from governmental attorneys,
cause lawyers, public interest, and community lawyers to class action and
corporate lawyers, have long argued that the Standard Conception and the
Rules that give life to it ill fit their practices. Geoff Hazard, for example,
has noted that “[m]any of the discussions regarding ethics of government
lawyers proceed from the premise that the client-lawyer relationship
between government lawyers and government entities is ‘different’ from the
counterpart relationship in private practice,”270 and another commentator
opined that
[t]raditional approaches to the responsibilities of government lawyers
have failed to provide a robust framework for analyzing the question of

266. Id.
267. Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience. The Dynamic Challenge of
Lawyers’ Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 821, 823 (1996).
268. Id. at 843.
269. Id. at 844–45.
270. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Conflicts of Interest Representation of Public Agencies in
Civil Matters, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 211, 212 (2000) (citing Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who Is the
Client of the Government Lawyer?, in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 13
(Patricia E. Salkin ed., 1999)).
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how government lawyers should exercise their discretion. . . . [T]his
failure is a result of an attempt to apply a model of legal ethics that is illsuited to the unique role of government attorneys.271

Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, leading authorities on cause lawyering,
have observed that within the traditional ideological and regulatory
framework, cause lawyers are a “deviant strain” of the profession,272 and
Shauna Marshall has noted that the community lawyering model “departs
from the traditional focus of a lawyer’s work—representing an individual
client.”273 Even securities lawyers have been challenged to abandon the
Standard Conception and act as gatekeepers in the public interest.274
Thirteen years after the publication of his pioneering Should Trees Have
Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,275 Christopher Stone
revisited his thesis and explained that rather than intending to focus on trees
and other natural objects, his goal was to explore the representation of all
“disinterested entities” defined as “various sorts of . . . membership sets,”
including tribes, nations and corporations,276 and question whether even if
we can “fit [disinterested entities] into the legal framework . . . ought we do
so?”277 Similarly, we question the need to fit group lawyers, tribal lawyers
included, into the standard legal framework of lawyering. “What I am
suggesting is the validity of, and not merely recognizing the convention of,
moral discourses that map membership entities, and consider them
according to their own governance,”278 added Stone, and, “by ‘validity’ I
mean that such discourses are capable of adding to, rather than, as
reductionism has it, distracting from, the insight and direction which our
moral lives require.”279 Stone concludes by arguing that “the position I am
advancing is not disregardful of axioms or principles, but is skeptical of the
single-minded stress on them.”280
Following Stone, our point here is not to wholly discredit the Standard
Conception or the Rules.
It should be acknowledged that some
commentators do believe that the Rules fit and should apply to group
lawyers,281 and many tribal lawyers and clients rely on the Rules to useful
271. Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1191 (2002).
272. CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 2001).
273. Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?:
Ethical Community Lawyering,
7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147, 212 (2000).
274. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003).
275. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
276. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law
and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (1985).
277. Id. at 39–40.
278. Id. at 137.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 142.
281. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1477 (arguing that the Rules should apply without any significant amendments
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effect. Rather, like other scholars of group lawyering, we wish to question
the wisdom of accepting the Standard Conception and the Rules as both the
start and finish point for understanding and assessing the conduct of group
lawyers and to argue that the experiences of tribal lawyers suggest that a
reductive adherence to the Rules may be unhelpful and even harmful for
group lawyers and their clients. Just as Stone “would displace the quest for
a single, all-encompassing framework, pretentious to govern all moral
thought, with an effort to develop different planes, each appropriate to
separate moral activities,”282 we argue that treating the individualistic
Standard Conception and the Rules that follow it as a single allencompassing framework for assessing the conduct of lawyers is a mistake.
Instead, like Stone, we believe that the experiences of tribal attorneys
amount to “different planes” of legal ethics that allow for “the role of
imagination in the development of ethical capacities.”283
The lessons that emerge from our analysis of tribal lawyering are broader
than simply identifying a list of potential revisions to particular Rules, such
as the rewriting of the concept of competence in Rule 1.1 to include
meaningful references to cultural, historical, and political knowhow and
literacy (although this would be desirable). Rather, the insights that emerge
speak to the need to create a space for competing diverse visions and
professional ideologies to emerge alongside the dominant ideology of the
Standard Conception—ideologies that will in turn inform and shape the
Rules and the role of lawyers for both groups and individuals. In the next
sections we outline a few such possible visions and then share examples of
Indian tribal and organizational codes and statements that reflect these
visions.
A. From “Zealous Advocacy” to “Effective Representation”
Zealous advocacy reflects the individualistic impulse of the basic model.
It assumes an individual client who establishes clear objectives and seeks to
pursue them either in an adversarial fashion in litigation or aggressively
across the negotiation table. It further assumes both that clients will be best
served by zeal and that lawyers’ main role is advocacy vis-à-vis an
opposing party. And indeed, for many individual clients and some group
clients, zealous advocacy is the very essence of effective representation.
But zealous advocacy is simply not a broad enough category to encompass
the range of needs for all clients, especially group clients.
Gary Bellow, reflecting on the meaning of effective representation as a
political attorney for groups, concisely captured the limitations of zealous
advocacy reduced to adversarial aggressive litigation:

to the conduct of class action lawyers); Nancy J. Moore, Who Will Regulate Class Action
Lawyers?, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 577 (2012) (same).
282. Stone, supra note 276, at 142.
283. Id. at 142–43.
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In some of the efforts, we sought rule changes or injunctive relief against
particular practice on behalf of an identified class. . . . Some strategies
were carried out in the courts. At other times we ignored litigation
entirely in favor of bureaucratic maneuvering and community and union
organizing. Even when pursuing litigation, we often placed far greater
emphasis on mobilizing and educating clients, or strengthening the
entities and organizations that represented then, than on judicial
outcomes.284

Importantly Bellow notes, “always, we employed the lawsuit . . . as a
vehicle for gathering information, positioning adversaries, asserting
bargaining leverage, and adding to the continuing process of definition and
designation that occurs in any conflict.”285 It is not that group lawyering is
inconsistent with aggressive litigation; rather, group lawyers ought not
come to understand zealous advocacy as consisting first, foremost, and
perhaps of nothing more than aggressive litigation. Such a narrow
approach risks misunderstanding and even betraying the goals of group
clients and the role of lawyers for them.
The same insight emerges from the experiences of government lawyers:
“The conventional wisdom, however, suggests that zealous representation
of clients is inappropriate for government lawyers. Most lawyers and
judges who have considered the ethical responsibilities of the government
lawyer have assumed that government counsel should temper their
advocacy in the interests of ‘justice.’”286 Such tempered zeal is warranted
notwithstanding the fact that government lawyers wish to win cases they
litigate and is justified given the boarder goals of the government lawyers
and her client—the government—to seek justice.287
Consider Robert Porter’s work on the meaning of indigenous national
sovereignty. Professor Porter argues that lawyers have usurped the
authority of tribes and have advanced an Americanized notion of
sovereignty causing tribes a significant harm. In some instances, Porter
notes, lawyers’ advice to the Seneca Nation was “more insidiously
transformative than any edict emanating from the mouth of some BIA
official” and “there was simply no way for our former president to know
that this attorney was destroying his own uniquely Seneca conception of
sovereignty by passing on as gospel the anti-Indian sovereignty views of the
United States Supreme Court.”288

284. Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 300 (1996).
285. Id.
286. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal
Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 955 (1991).
287. Berenson, supra note 30, at 813–35; Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined:
Specific Obligations that Follow from Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty To Serve
the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 13, 17–31 (2003).
288. Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
75, 92 (2002).
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As this example potentially suggests, sometimes an important aspect of
group representation entails not external needs vis-à-vis opposing parties
but rather internal needs of building identity and group relations. For such
groups, effective representation might require, at times, not narrow zealous
advocacy but tentative and mindful facilitation. A group lawyer in these
circumstances might better serve her clients by abandoning warm zeal,
aggression, and a combative posture and replacing them with what Deborah
Cantrell, writing about lawyers and social change, calls “an approach of
curiosity,”289 fostering not the naked pursuit of individualistic self-interest
but representation in the spirit of building webs of relationships within
groups and vis-à-vis others.290
With the benefit of Cantrell’s insights, one might reimagine the
conversation between a tribal nation and its lawyers.291 Rather than merely
advising the client about the Supreme Court’s view of Indian rights (and the
likelihood of losing most cases), the lawyer might listen carefully to the
tribal leaders’ description of the interests and goals associated with rights
claims, and then advise the client accordingly. As one example, the
Onondaga Nation of New York is working with its lawyers to resolve
historic land claims, but rather than focus purely on tribal rights, it has
identified objectives including the clean-up of local natural resources and
restoration of relationships with non-Indian neighbors. At the insistence of
tribal leaders, the Onondaga land-claim complaint drafted by attorneys Joe
Heath and Curtis Berkey calls for “healing of the land and water . . . with all
people who live within the Onondaga original territory.”292 While still
pursuing litigation, the Onondaga Nation’s lawyers are working on a
strategy that includes community meetings, relationship building, and a
discussion of shared interests.
To reiterate, we are not questioning the appropriateness of zealous
advocacy in all instances. Some tribes may want to pursue the most
aggressive litigation or transactional strategy available, and given their
history of oppression and dispossession, they may well be entitled, if not
necessarily likely to prevail in today’s courts. But some tribes may want to
take a different approach. In this regard, we are mindful of the powerful
work of Aziz Rana, who has suggested an ethic of “democratic lawyering”
289. Deborah J. Cantrell, Lawyers, Loyalty and Social Change, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 941,
966–67 (2013).
290. Id. at 964–66; see also Pearce & Wald, supra note 135, at 32–52 (criticizing
lawyering that reflects and legitimizes autonomous self-interest and calling for a relational
approach to the practice of law). See generally ROBERT K. VISCHER, MARTIN LUTHER KING
JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE (2013).
291. Porter, supra note 288, at 92–93 (“[L]awyers representing Indigenous peoples
generally fail to adequately take into account their client’s own sovereignty perspective . . . .
[T]his mentality has the effect of promoting within the lawyer a practice style that has the
effect of ensuring conformity with the American conception.”); see also Robert B. PorterOdawi, Two Kinds of Indians, Two Kinds of Indian Nation Sovereignty: A Surreply to
Professor LaVelle, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 646–47 (2002).
292. See Review of the Onondaga Land Rights Hearing in NYC, ONONDAGA NATION
(Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.onondaganation.org/news/2012/2012_1015.html.
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in which the lawyer works on the “creation of processes for participatory
citizenship as a potential solution to class disagreement.”293 Therefore, we
question a single-minded emphasis on zealous advocacy as the obvious
baseline for all lawyers, group lawyers included. We are suggesting that
such an all-encompassing framework may at times be inconsistent with the
effective representation of clients and worse, suppress imaginative
alternatives to effective group lawyering. Our analysis suggests some of
these alternatives. In lieu of narrow-minded zeal reduced to aggressive
litigation, all lawyers but especially group lawyers, need to be curious,
open-minded, and knowledgeable about other approaches to effectively
representing clients.294
Next, group lawyers, even when Rule 1.13 allows them to identify who is
authorized to speak on behalf of the group, ought not show too great a
deference to the authorized constituency, especially in representing what
Paul Tremblay has called “loosely-structured groups.”295 Warm zeal and
great deference to clients are certainly often justified, especially in the
representation of individual clients. But reductive zeal, when combined
with strong deference to clients, might be counterproductive—even
harmful—in the context of group clients. Writing about community
lawyers, Tremblay compellingly argues that, “[j]ust as powerless group
members ought not to be dominated by the professional lawyers in suits, it
is similarly true . . . that powerless group members ought not be dominated
by the more vocal and educated leaders within the community.”296 This
insight rings true in the representation of tribes as well as other group
clients: “To the extent that corporate law principles applied to the . . .
group setting require the lawyer to honor the instructions of the entity’s
‘duly authorized constituents,’ the paradigmatic counseling responsibility of
a . . . group lawyer might serve to ‘reproduce hierarchy,’ even when the
lawyer adopts [a] respectful and humble posture.”297
Finally, letting go of a reductive construction of “zealous advocacy”
might open the door to better, broader education for group lawyers in
appropriate circumstances. Here, we mean more than the important
recognition of the shortcomings of too narrow a reading of competency per
Rule 1.1, and its expansion to include the notions of cultural competency
and literacy. We mean to evoke, following Tony Alfieri, the notions of
pedagogy of community and public citizenship, as well as mindfulness of
group identity and spirituality.298

293. See Rana, supra note 14, at 1728.
294. Cantrell, supra note 289; see also Bellow, supra note 284.
295. Paul R. Tremblay, Counseling Community Groups, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 389, 421–
54 (2010).
296. Id. at 461–62.
297. Id. at 462 (citations omitted).
298. Anthony V. Alfieri, Educating Lawyers for Community, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 115, 118–
30; Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and
Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 469.
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B. From “Nonaccountability” to “Client Empowerment”
The principle of nonaccountability reflects a commitment to honor the
autonomy and decision-making authority of individual clients. It signifies
the deference of lawyers-agents to clients-principals. Exactly because
clients alone are exercising their autonomy and determine the objectives of
the relationship, lawyers are nonaccountable for the goals they help bring
about. But for some individual clients and many group clients, lawyers
simply do not play the role of mere agents. Rather, lawyers take a more
proactive role in designing and participating in determining the goals of the
representation. In such circumstances, respect and pursuit of client
empowerment simply does not require nonaccountability and may in fact
demand lawyer accountability.
Cause lawyers, in contrast to the Standard Conception, are anything but
nonaccountable. In fact,
[l]awyering is for them attractive precisely because it is a deeply moral or
political activity, a kind of work that encourages pursuit of their vision of
the right, the good, or the just. Cause lawyers have something to believe
in and bring their beliefs to bear on their work lives.299

As noted by Gary Bellow, “[w]e were not detached professionals offering
advice and representation regardless of consequences; we saw ourselves
responsible for, and committed to, shaping those consequences.”300
Similarly, a government lawyer, while “adopting as central the duties of
loyalty, zeal, and confidentiality, puts relatively greater emphasis on the
duties of the lawyer to the court and to innocent third parties”;301 that is, she
feels accountable for the outcomes she helps bring about.
In turn, lawyers’ accountability to the causes of their clients raises a wellexplored concern about attorneys’ usurpation of clients’ autonomy and
power in the attorney-client relationship.302 Accountability to clients when
lawyers believe in, and have a stake and an interest in, the outcome of the
representations, is a serious concern experienced by many group lawyers
and their clients, from cause lawyers303 to class action attorneys.304
299. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 3 (2004).
300. Bellow, supra note 284.
301. Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, supra note
271, at 1171.
302. The problem of paternalism vis-à-vis clients, it should be noted, is of course not
unique to group lawyers. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers,
68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); Simon, supra note 222; Wald, supra note 222.
303. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (exploring the tension
between the goal of desegregation sought by cause lawyers and the interests of actual
clients—parents who were often as interested in the quality of public education received by
their children as they were in the overall objective of desegregation). See generally CHEN &
CUMMINGS, supra note 31, at 289–90.
304. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 292 (2010) (Class actions do “solve the problem of
providing a feasible remedy for ‘negative value’ claims—that is, those claims that, while
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Moreover, as Deborah Cantrell thoughtfully points out, “hyper-loyalty” to
clients and their objectives entails serious risks beyond usurping clients’
autonomy. Hyper-loyalty is dangerous and could become inconsistent with
effective representation because it limits the range of strategies,
relationships, and solutions group lawyers might entertain with an open
mind on behalf of clients.305
As was the case with zealous advocacy, we do not wish to wholly
undermine nonaccountability nor to belittle the challenges associated with
lawyers’ accountability for clients’ goals. We do, however, believe that the
experiences of tribal lawyers and other group lawyers highlight the
shortcomings of strict adherence to the principle of nonaccountability as the
benchmark for attorney professionalism. Instead, we want to suggest client
empowerment as a boarder principle that is inclusive of traditional
nonaccountability in appropriate circumstances as well as of lawyer
accountability in other instances.
By client empowerment we do not mean merely the avoidance of
paternalism by lawyers vis-à-vis clients in the client-centered representation
tradition,306 nor do we ignore the inherent risk of disempowering clients by
the very exercise of lawyers’ accountability to clients’ objectives. As we
have seen, imputing goals to clients and treating clients paternalistically is
not a new charge leveled against lawyers.307 Rather, by empowerment of
clients we mean “the promise to unite client/community autonomy with
systemic reform so that community members become the authors of their
own stories and the agents of their own change,”308 a process that takes
enabling, promoting, and respecting group decision making as its goals.309
It is, admittedly, a risky process that acknowledges the dangers of lawyers’
accountability, usurpation of clients’ autonomy and power, and hyperloyalty. But it is a necessary risk, especially in lawyering for loose groups,
a context in which lawyers “are not simply carriers of a cause but are at the
same time those who shape it, name it and voice it,”310 exactly because of
the loose nature of decision making and exercise of authority within the
group.311
meritorious, have an enforcement cost in excess of their individual value. But this benefit
comes at the cost of creating principal-agent problems that remain intractable despite
repeated efforts by Congress and the court to curb highly visible abuses.”).
305. Cantrell, supra note 289, at 955–63; Wald, supra note 130.
306. GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991).
307. Simon, supra note 222.
308. CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 31, at 318–19.
309. Lucie E. White, Seeking “. . . the Faces of Otherness . . . ”: A Response to
Professors Sarat, Felstiner and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1501–09 (1992).
310. Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinski, Destruction of Houses and Construction of a Cause:
Lawyers and Bedouins in the Israeli Courts, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 231 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
eds., 1998).
311. Tremblay, supra note 295.
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Porter, for example, is specific in his view of what is required of tribal
lawyers: “The attorney representing an Indigenous nation has just as much
an obligation to advise his or her client of that nation’s views of its own
sovereignty as it does the American view.” Viewed in this light, Porter’s
statement that “I teach [students] the truth about America’s agenda to
destroy the Indian nations and how they, as American trained lawyers, can
use their skills to rebuild their own nations in the image of their own
people”312 sounds like a call to embrace not partisan zealous advocacy and
nonaccountability but instead effective representation and client
empowerment.
A move away from a narrow conception of nonaccountability in
appropriate circumstances might allow group lawyers to better serve their
clients. Consider, once again, the Rules’ approach to conflict of interests,
and, in particular, to positional and ideological conflicts. In the context of
representing individuals and some entity clients, the Rules’ narrow
construction of conflicts may be quite sensible; moreover, it probably
reflects the practice and business realities of many law firms, large and
small. Indeed, some have called for further narrowing Rules on conflicts to
better reflect the demands of the market for legal services.313
Consider, for example, the situation of commercial law firms whose
experience in complex transactions on Indian reservations yields
opportunities to represent both tribes and non-Indian investors. Even
lawyers deeply committed to tribal sovereignty as a general matter can find
themselves challenging it if they represent a non-Indian party in a deal that
falls apart, much to the chagrin of some tribal clients who expect “their”
lawyers to defend tribal jurisdiction, immunity, and sovereignty more
broadly. Tribes may face similar questions when they assess the loyalty of
lobbyists or litigators who represent tribes on certain matters and advocate
against them in others. At an even finer grain, some tribes will not
appreciate it when an attorney moves from representing one tribe to
another.
Of course this concern is not unique to Indian tribes as clients. Lawyers
may face similar pressures to advocate consistently with a certain position
in everything from employment litigation to intellectual property rights.
Moreover, from the client’s perspective, it may be wise to take stock of the
fact that the law firm lawyer is likely to have a broader set of potential
conflicts and loyalty issues than the in-house lawyer. Moreover, the fact
that some clients have greater expectations of attorney loyalty to the group,
industry, or cause does not mean, of course, that a group and its lawyers
cannot mutually agree on a more narrowly tailored duty of loyalty. It does
mean, however, that lawyers would be well served to acknowledge the
different loyalty expectations of different clients. Perhaps, as Tracy Zlock
312. Porter-Odawi, supra note 291, at 647.
313. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, No Conflict, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207 (2012)
(arguing, inter alia, that “wholly unrelated” matters should never trigger a conflict of interest
pursuant to Rule 1.7).
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suggests in the Indian context, some lawyers for groups should be subject to
special communication and disclosure requirements when representing
clients that expect and, indeed, reasonably need greater loyalty.314
C. Challenging the Primacy of Professional Identity over
Nonprofessional Identity
Nonaccountability explains the primacy of professional identity over
nonprofessional identity pursuant to the Standard Conception. Because
clients, and clients alone, exercise authority over setting the objectives of
the attorney-client relationship, and lawyers are reduced to mere
mouthpieces on behalf of clients, lawyers are implicitly encouraged to
practice law qua lawyers with a universal professional identity divorced
from any aspects of their personal identity. Exactly because lawyers are
nonaccountable to the objectives pursued by their clients, their personal
identities, values, and commitments are irrelevant to their practice of law
and their professional identity.
Leading scholars of the profession have challenged such “bleached-out
professionalism” and have explored the complex and nuanced ways in
which personal identity does and should help inform and shape a lawyer’s
professional identity.315 Our analysis—in particular our questioning of
nonaccountability as the only and obvious baseline of lawyering—joins
such calls for further exploration of the interplay of professional and
personal identity and cautions against unreflectively accepting the
dominance of the former over the latter.
Of course, some lawyers may choose to accept the primacy of law and its
conception of universal professional identity over aspects of their personal
identity. For example, some Jewish lawyers practicing in the mid-twentieth
century chose professional identity as lawyers as a means toward
assimilation and becoming American.316 For these lawyers, the answer to
the question “what does it mean to be a Jewish lawyer” exemplifies the
supremacy of law over their ethnoreligious identity: to be a lawyer first,
then Jewish, in the sense that one’s ethnoreligious identity is secondary to
one’s professional identity. The same prioritization of professional identity
over personal identity, at least in the workplace, resounds with many other
lawyers as well.317
314. Zlock, supra note 78, at 183.
315. David B. Wilkins, Beyond “Bleached Out” Professionalism: Defining Professional
Responsibility for Real Professionals, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 207, 218–25, 230–34 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000);
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); see
also DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN POSTRACIAL AMERICA (2013).
316. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, RABBIS AND LAWYERS: THE JOURNEY FROM TORAH TO
CONSTITUTION (1990).
317. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 315, at 1262 (exploring how “incentives and
pressures to signal and work one’s identity shape the workplace behavior and experiences of
outsider groups, such as women and minorities”).
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Yet there is nothing inherently obvious about such a choice. Others may
legitimately view their professional identity as secondary to their personal
identity. Law can certainly be a useful tool, but it is not inherently
constitutive of lawyers qua lawyers or of lawyers qua people. The late
Navajo lawyer and judge Claudeen Bates Arthur wrote, “[M]y clan
relationships tell me who I really am.”318 These relationships, and the
cultural identity that they reflect, create some tension between personal and
professional identities. As she stated, “The dilemma is there: outside
external thinking and philosophy and internal tribal identity.”319 In her
view, the way to reconcile this tension is to distinguish between internal and
external matters:
[W]e must deal with internal matters from the standpoint of rules and law
set forth by the Holy People. We must deal with external forces from the
standpoint of their rules and laws, perhaps that is the Uniform
Commercial Code, contracts, or other such subjects. Tribal lawyers
should make those distinctions and remember to preserve and protect that
which is internal if cultural sovereignty is to survive.320

In a similar vein, G. William Rice, a prominent professor, tribal attorney,
and former elected leader of the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians, has explained that, from his perspective, “it makes no sense to
adopt power, rank, and wealth as the measure of individual honor and
attainment, and disregard our traditional standards of fairness, generosity,
humble attitudes, and respectable actions in life.”321 Indeed, tribal
attorneys and Indian societies have access to “an alternative view of society,
social processes, and human kind’s place on this earth.”322 From this
perspective, Rice proposes that “as Tribal Attorneys, then, we must protect
and, where necessary, begin the process of recovering, our own tribal
identities, governmental structures, social control methodologies, and
dispute resolution systems.”323
While drawing on Native religion and culture for strength in legal
practice, however, Pawnee attorney Walter Echo-Hawk articulates a clear
line between the attorney and the client. As he explains:
As an attorney you’re an advocate for other people. The best attorneys
are the ones that try to maintain a professional outlook . . . It can be very
trying sometimes. You always have to maintain your professional duties.
It’s not about you, it’s about your client. Try to be grounded in your own
culture and spirituality that you have. That will give you strength.324
318. Arthur, supra note 209, at 21.
319. Id. at 25.
320. Id. at 25–26.
321. G. William Rice, Of Cold Steel and Blueprints: Musings of an Old Country Lawyer
on Crime, Jurisprudence, and the Tribal Attorney’s Role in Developing Tribal Sovereignty,
7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 51 (1997).
322. Id. at 52.
323. Id.
324. Dana Attocknie, Warrior Nerd: Pawnee Fights of Native Rights, OKLA. NATIVE
TIMES, Feb. 2011, available at http://www.crowedunlevy.com/Websites/crowedunlevy2010/
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Our point, to be clear, is not that there is something wrong with choosing
to embrace one’s professional identity as a lawyer as a constitutive or even
dominant aspect of one’s identity. Rather, it is that for many lawyers who
are group members, including some Native Americans and other minorities,
to accept law as completely defining one’s professional role is to deny the
past and to concede alternative conceptions of the future. It is also to ignore
the discriminatory treatment that Native American lawyers may receive at
the hands of others who will attribute, often incorrectly, stereotypes and
assumptions about the confluence of their personal and professional
identities.325
Moreover, the traditional Standard Conception discourse does not
acknowledge a space for group/tribal identity as a meaningful aspect of
one’s professional identity. As we have seen, the counterweight for the
professional identity is conceptualized as various “personal” aspects of
one’s identity, such that if one, as an individual lawyer, chooses to highlight
her identity as a Native American, she is welcome to do so. But developing
one’s identity as a group member is simply not part of a discourse in an
environment that enshrines individualism as its core value.
Yet such an exclusion of group identity as a meaningful component of
one’s professional identity is neither intuitive nor inevitable. Professor
Strickland argues:
[One] must be both an Indian and a lawyer. By this, I do not mean that
every Indian must serve only Indian clients or Indian cases or even that
lawyers who are Indians should not choose to serve clients exclusively in
a non-Indian world. But I personally think the rewards are greatest for the
Indian lawyer who wants to direct himself toward legal problems for the
Indian people.326

Robert A. Williams, Jr.,327 and Stacy L. Leeds,328 both prominent law
professors and tribal members, have written evocatively about the American
Indian community’s expectations for them to apply their legal training and
professional resources to problems in tribal communities.
These
expectations did not come as a huge surprise, as Williams tells it, because
I was raised in a traditional Indian home, which meant I was raised to
think independently and to act for others. . . . [M]y upbringing meant that

Images/News/Echo-Hawk%20Article%20-%20Feb11.pdf (alteration in original) (quoting
Walter Echo Hawk).
325. See generally Baca, supra note 110 (recounting his experiences as the first Native
American attorney in the Justice Department); see also MARIA CHÁVEZ, EVERYDAY
INJUSTICE—LATINO PROFESSIONALS AND RACISM (2011).
326. Id. at 52.
327. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race
Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 741 (1997).
328. See Stacy L. Leeds, A Tribal Court Domestic Violence Case: The Story of an
Unknown Victim, an Unreported Decision, and an All Too Common Injustice, in WOMEN
AND THE LAW STORIES 456–58 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds.,
2011). Leeds is now the Dean of the University of Arkansas Law School.
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I had to endure probing questions at the family dinner table, asked by my
elders, like, “Boy, what have you done for your people today?”329

He faced the same kinds of expectations when he became a law professor at
the University of Arizona and local tribes began calling for legal
assistance.330 Leeds received similar inquiries from tribes in Oklahoma and
Kansas. Yet both Williams and Leeds were instructed by senior law school
colleagues, and institutional pressures more generally, that spending
substantial time on “service” would detract from the pursuit of legal
scholarship and tenure. Nevertheless, as Leeds tells it, she chose to “say
yes”—in her case by serving as a judge on many tribal courts—because
“saying no to an American Indian community in need could leave that
community without adequate legal assistance.”331 Williams, too, ultimately
chose to infuse his professional practice with cultural morality, creating an
indigenous human rights clinic that would train students by representing
tribal clients.332
Group morality may inhere not only in career choices but also in
lawyering strategies. Some of the most difficult ethical cases in Indian
Country pit tribal sovereignty against individual civil rights.333 In their
most extreme formulation, these cases juxtapose tribal survival with
individual liberties. But across Indian Country advocates have begun to
consider that perhaps the characterization and treatment of these cases in
such extreme, adversarial terms is itself a leftover of the colonial process
that would be handled better by revitalizing distinctly tribal forms of
dispute resolution that reconcile collective and individual rights. Wenona
Singel—a prominent law professor and tribal court judge, as well as a
citizen of the Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians—has, for
example, advocated the development of an intertribal human rights tribunal
that would rely on tribal norms and processes to address tribal and
individual concerns.334 Professor Singel courageously acknowledges that
329. See Williams, supra note 327, at 743.
330. See id. at 758–59 (“[A]ll these requests for help started ‘interfering with my writing,’
not to mention my serious reading time. I had to make excuses, like ‘Gee, I’d like to help
you out by taking your tribe’s land claim to the International Court of Justice at the Hague,
but I’ve got to finish this law review article applying Frantz Fanon to Indian law that maybe
a dozen or so people who also write on Indian law will read.’ . . . What these Arizona
Indians really wanted me to do was to get off my critical race theory ass and do some serious
Critical Race Practice. They didn’t give a damn about the relationship between hegemony
and false consciousness. They wanted help for their problems, and I was a resource. That’s
why they were so tough on me. See, to be a leader in an Indian community means going off
the res to bring in resources to help the community. That meant that all these people asking
me for help were assuming the responsibility of being Indian leaders which meant they could
get right in my face and tell me to ‘act like an Indian’ and give something back, rather than
take, take, take.”).
331. See Leeds, supra note 328, at 457.
332. See Williams, supra note 327, at 762–63.
333. See supra note 154 (discussing the Santa Clara Pueblo and Cherokee Freedmen
cases).
334. See Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 567 (2012) (acknowledging tribes as potential violators of human rights and
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tribes can be human rights violators—a point that is often difficult for tribal
advocates and scholars to accept—but also have the capacity to provide
their citizens with venues for redress.335
These examples show how several American Indian lawyers have
embraced the morality of the community in which they are members—a
morality that expects individuals with particular resources to contribute
them for the good of the group—managing to successfully navigate
professional pressures to the contrary. Such a professional group-identity
may not appeal to all lawyers representing groups, or even to all American
Indians representing tribes. But it is an important alternative to the
Standard Conception, foreclosed by the dominant ideology and the Rules
that implement it. Scholars of the legal profession have cautioned about the
perils of making universal assumptions about clients, lawyers, and their
relationships and have compellingly advocated for a careful study of the
profession in context.336 Yet navigating the space between universalism
and contextual analysis is often a challenging task. In particular, while
attention to context, such as studying the experiences of tribal lawyers, is
imperative, there is at the same time a legitimate concern and therefore a
reluctance to associate special skill sets or experiences with particular
groups. Such categorization smacks of essentialism or even discriminatory
bias, especially when generalizations are made about political, racial, or
ethnic minorities. And so it becomes difficult and highly charged to discuss
the role of personal and group identity in the professional lives of tribal
lawyers.
In American Indian communities, as well as other groups, identity
questions are front and center, and these questions affect the professional
lives of tribal lawyers. In particular, tribal members are usually very aware
of an individual’s relationship to the community, whether he or she is a
relative, enrolled tribal member, or otherwise recognized by the community
as an Indian—and the lawyer’s status in this regard will almost certainly be
a factor in the reception he or she receives by the community. As described
above, a lawyer’s membership in the community may help him or her
access and imbue the community’s values in practice. On the other hand,
the lawyer’s membership in an Indian tribe could also create conflicts of
interest337 where, for example, the lawyer/member has a direct financial,
political, or other stake in the outcome of a matter wherein the tribe is a
party. We suggest, therefore, that the question of identity—professional,
personal, and group—goes to the tribal lawyer’s professional effectiveness

proposing a new intertribal dispute resolution system that would address human rights claims
in a manner that respects tribal procedural and substantive norms of justice).
335. See id.
336. David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993).
337. See Gerald Hill, Conflicts of Interests for Tribal Lawyers, Representing Their Own
Tribes, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 149–54 (1999).
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in a way that challenges the traditional divide between role morality and
common morality/identity.
In typically compelling fashion, Norm Spaulding argues that lawyers
should not too closely identify with their clients. A lawyer’s role, asserts
Spaulding, “is grounded in a logic of service, not identification,”338
pursuant to which lawyers ought to diligently represent clients “irrespective
of any personal, moral, or ideological affinity between them.”339 Moreover,
“[i]dentification, by contrast, turns the role into an object of self-realization
for the lawyer. Intense identification between lawyer and client—what I
call ‘thick professional identity’—is typically a self-interested perversion of
the service norm.”340 Spaulding’s call for lawyers to reject thick
professional identity is certainly plausible and persuasive in some contexts,
especially in the individualistic sphere of criminal defense.341 Indeed, we
are not arguing that, to use Spaulding’s terminology, thick professional
identity is required of all tribal or group lawyers, or even that it is superior
to or more desirable than thin professional identity. We do, however,
believe that for some group lawyers, some of the time, group identity is
relevant and plays a role in the construction of their professional identity
and representation of clients. By denying that role and the space for
exploring the relevance of thick (or at least thicker) professional identity,
the Standard Conception does a disservice to both group clients and their
lawyers.
D. Some Models from Indian Country
We have argued that the stories of tribal lawyers reveal the need for
diverse visions and professional ideologies to emerge alongside the
dominant ideology of the Standard Conception. To some extent, tribes and
American Indian law organizations have begun to make space for these
alternative conceptions. Several national and tribal bar associations, tribal
legislatures, and other bodies have expressed concepts of client
empowerment, attorney accountability, and tribal identity in their own
statements of professional responsibility.
The National Native American Bar Association (NNABA), for example,
states that its collective mission is “Representing Indian Nations not just
Indian Lawyers.”342 In this regard the NNABA’s purpose is about more
than support for lawyers who happen to be American Indian and is also
about more that promoting cross-cultural awareness. Instead, the NNABA
338. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,
6 (2003).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 101 (“[I]t strikes me as the highest order manifestation of service through thin
identity—being willing to serve where the most dire need exists quite irrespective of whether
one identifies with the personal attributes or positions of the clients one serves and quite
irrespective of the prospects for material reward or social approval.”).
342. NAT’L NATIVE AM. B. ASS’N, supra note 109.
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articulates: “[M]ost of our lawyers are both U.S. citizens and citizens of
their respective Tribal nations. Our members, therefore, also share the
communal responsibility, either directly or indirectly, of protecting the
governmental sovereignty of the more than 560 independent Native
American Tribal governments in the United States.”343 This is a clear
recognition and embrace of the relationship between the identity of the
lawyer-members and a standard of professional conduct.344 The NNABA
mission is not without complexity, given that it does not define the concept
of “protecting governmental sovereignty” nor does it articulate how to
weigh the interests of individual Indians or other parties against tribal
governments. Yet, most American Indian lawyers will understand this
statement as reflecting a relatively clear and commonly shared sense of
professional obligation to advance tribal self-determination against other
interests. As a general matter, the NNABA statements are important
because, while they are not binding or enforceable, they set expectations for
Indian lawyers wherever they practice and, in this regard, are arguably
broader and more unifying than the reservation-based codes described
below.
In another example, the National Tribal Judicial Center at the National
Judicial College promulgated a “Sample Tribal Code of Judicial Conduct”
in 2007.345 The project aims to equip tribal courts with tools that they need
to foster a sense of institutional dignity and legitimacy, with external and
internal constituents. These concerns are particularly acute with the
passage of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, restoring a certain
measure of tribal court authority over criminal matters,346 and the
increasing presence of business interests in Indian Country.347 As one
attorney notes:
Private businesses are very afraid of the notion of a tribal court. Tribes
have recognized that impression and have been trying to say, ‘This is a
legitimate system . . . . The adoption of the model codes in wide usage,
which people understand inside and outside the tribal context, would be
helpful in that regard.’348

For some of these reasons, perhaps, the Sample Tribal Code incorporates
much of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. SAMPLE TRIBAL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT: A TEMPLATE (2007), available at
http://www.judges.org/pdf/ntjc_samplecode.pdf.
346. Office of the Tribal Prosecutor, Tribe Passes Enhanced Sentencing Law,
ONE FEATHER (August 23, 2012), http://theonefeather.com/2012/08/tribe-passes-enhancedsentencing-law/.
347. Ed Finkel, Economics and Culture Both Put Their Stamp on Ethics Rules in Tribal
Courts, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/economics_
and_culture_both_put_their_stamp_on_ethics_rules_in_tribal_courts/ (quoting W. Gregory
Guedel, Chair of the Native American Concerns Committee in the ABA Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities).
348. Id. (quoting W. Gregory Guedel, Chair of the Native American Concerns Committee
in the ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities).
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Notwithstanding this substantial nod to uniformity, however, the drafters
of the Sample Tribal Code contemplated certain considerations specific to
tribal courts, including the fact that some tribal courts recognize
nonattorney judges, use nonadversarial peacemaking techniques, or permit
judges to receive culturally sanctioned gifts.349 Another key issue was
“whether to prohibit ex parte communications with judges . . . in close-knit
Indian communities where judges are looked to as community pillars in the
broader sense.”350 In the words of seasoned tribal court judge B.J. Jones,
“The tribal judge is more than an arbitrator of disputes. You’ve got to be
actively involved in the community.”351 To make room for these norms
and values, the Tribal Sample Code was “designed to encourage tribal
courts to tweak it as much as they want.”352
As the Sample Tribal Code foreshadows, tribes have begun to articulate
their own professional norms, though various vehicles including tribal
legislative codes, tribal constitutions, tribal bar associations, and even tribal
attorney job descriptions. As we have noted above, this sovereign power to
enact regulation within the tribal territory is one of the attributes that
differentiates Indian tribes from most other groups in the United States. For
example, the Navajo Nation, through its legislative code, prohibits the
unauthorized practice of law on the reservation.353 To become eligible to
practice in the Navajo Nation, an individual must become a member of the
Navajo Nation Bar Association,354 with admission ultimately overseen by
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.355 Applicants must take the Navajo Bar
Exam, which tests on general subjects (torts, contracts, domestic relations,
and so on) and on Navajo law (e.g., Navajo children’s law, tribal
jurisdiction, and peacemaking). The Navajo Bar Association requires a
“prescribed course in Navajo law, culture, traditions and history” prior to
sitting for the bar.356 The bar association’s website explains key legal terms
in the Navajo language such as “naalyeeh,” a concept that is closely related
to restitution and takes into account harmony, clan relationships, and hard
feelings among people—and “ke” or a concept of equality, reciprocity,
respect that facilitates consensual solutions.357 Not unlike certain U.S.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. (quoting Christine Folsom-Smith, a program attorney at the National Tribal
Judicial Center).
353. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 606 (2005); NATION NATION CODE ANN. tit. 17,
§ 377.
354. See Navajo Nation Bar Ass’n, Inc., Bylaws § I(A), available at http://www.navajo
law.org/New2008/bylaws.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
355. See, e.g., Tafoya v. Navajo Nation Bar Ass’n, 6 Navajo Rptr. 141 (1989) (“While the
NNBA does possess the power to conduct revocation proceedings, only the Navajo Supreme
Court has the ultimate power to revoke a practitioner’s license and membership in the
NNBA.”), reprinted in JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARA DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL
STUDIES 405–16 (2d ed. 2010).
356. See Bylaws, supra note 354, § III(D)(4).
357. See Navajo Common Law, NAVAJO NATION B. ASS’N, available at http://www
.navajolaw.org/New2008/ncl.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
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states (e.g., New Hampshire and California), the Navajo Nation allows
individuals who have not graduated from law school to take the bar358—but
at the Navajo Nation, this track is reserved for members of any federally
recognized tribe who have completed an undergraduate, paralegal, or other
approved educational program.359 In these many respects, the Navajo
Nation, through its legislative code and bar association, appears to address
issues of ethics, culture competency, and individual Indian empowerment
that have diminished representation of tribal clients in the past. Such an
approach could be—and often is—modeled by other tribes with specific
crafting to their own norms, values, and processes.360
Finally, we note that several tribes have begun to provide legal services
for individual tribal members. As we noted above, tribal attorneys often
receive legal inquiries from individual tribal members, but under an entitybased approach to representation, the tribal attorney is bound to decline,
citing her singular duty to the tribe as client. That response is not
particularly satisfying in the many tribal communities where attorneys and
the money to pay for them may be in short supply, and where tribal
members see the tribal attorney’s office as a source of much-needed
professional information. The Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians
recently passed legislation creating an “Office of Citizens Legal
Assistance” in the Legal Department of the Tribe.361 The Office may assist
tribal citizens with drafting and advice on matters such as estate planning,
real estate, landlord-tenant issues, divorce, and guardianships.362 The
Office cannot, however, appear in tribal court or to assist in matters wherein
the tribe is involved.363 In an analogous mode, the Office of the
Reservation Attorney (ORA) of the Tulalip Tribes of Washington may
“provide information, referral and legal assistance to Tulalip tribal members
on minor matters where the assistance does not present an apparent conflict
with the ORA’s primary duty to provide legal consel to the Tulalip
Tribes.”364 While traditional legal services, operated independently of
tribes, have provided similar assistance,365 these new programs suggest an
358. This practice is coming under pressure with the recently passed amendments to the
Violence Against Women Act that restore to tribal courts jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants in certain domestic violence matters.
359. Bylaws, supra note 354, § III(C).
360. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 355, at 405–34 (describing examples of
professional responsibility standards, as articulated in tribal codes and court opinions, from
the Colville Tribe, Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, Navajo Nation, Bay Mills
Indian Community, Fort Peck Tribe, and Hopi Tribe).
361. See WAGANAKISING ODAWAK STAT. #2012-006 (2012), available at http://www.ltb
bodawa-nsn.gov/odawaregister/legislative/Statutes/2012/WOS%202012-006%20Office%20
of%20Citizens%20Legal%20Assistance.pdf.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See, e.g., Tulalip Tribal Codes, TULALIP TRIBES, § IV, http://www.tulaliptribesnsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/LegalReservationAttorney.aspx (last visited Apr.
19, 2013).
365. See, e.g., About Native Legal Net, NATIVE LEGAL NET, http://nativelegalnet.org/
page/about-native-legal-net (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (“DNA People’s Legal Services is a
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understanding of a more capacious role for the tribal attorney’s office in
meeting the needs of citizens, albeit with careful attention to potential
conflicts.
In our view, these examples begin to reflect the complex roles of lawyers
for both groups and individuals. The Sample Tribal Code, albeit geared
toward judges, offers a helpful model for how the Rules of Professional
Conduct, designed for the classic model of individual lawyering, might be
used in group settings. It sets a baseline of professional expectations,
reflecting consensus on minimum standards for lawyers across the country,
but leaves space for each tribe to express its own cultural norms and
relationships, and to reflect its own tribal history and political structures.
The NNABA Mission, in turn, suggests that bar associations and other
groups of professionals can also take a role in articulating standards and
expectations of attorney conduct that are more capacious and more
responsive to particular groups. And tribal codes and bar associations
increasingly recognize cultural competency, Indian empowerment, and the
concerns of individual tribal members as within the considerations that
attorneys for tribes should take into account, where possible.
We consider all of these examples important alternatives, modifications,
and supplements to the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct with
their slim content on group lawyering. Notably, most of these tribalspecific statements of ethics are moderate variations on the Rules; they do
not, for example, tend to discount the role of attorneys, adversarial
proceedings, or U.S. law altogether. And they often acknowledge the utility
of having a common baseline that provides some consistency across
representation of Indian tribes. This approach is, like much legal reform
occurring in Indian Country,366 a reasonable and manageable step toward
decolonizing the relationship between tribes and their lawyers. It gives
tribes and their lawyers a starting point for their common involvement in
tribal, state, and federal legal systems—a set of minimum expectations that
lawyers for tribes have often failed to meet in the past—while articulating
and giving voice to Indian cultural and political norms where they depart
from the mainstream. Beyond these examples, tribal governments,
professional associations and organizations, along with other groups, will
surely continue to develop additional alternatives and complements to the
Rules.

501(c)(3) nonprofit legal aid organization working to protect civil rights, promote tribal
sovereignty and alleviate civil legal problems for people who live in poverty in the
Southwestern United States. Since 1967, DNA has provided free legal aid in remote
portions of three states and seven Native American nations, helping thousands of low income
people annually to achieve long lasting economic stability by providing access to tribal, state
and federal justice systems.”); see also MICH. INDIAN LEGAL SERVICES, http://www
.mils3.org/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (“Michigan Indian Legal Services provides legal
services to low income Indian individuals and tribes to further self sufficiency, overcome
discrimination, assist tribal governments and preserve Indian families.”).
366. See Champagne, supra note 200.
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CONCLUSION
As lawyers and clients evaluate how best to use the power of the law and
legal profession, there is perhaps something to be learned from the
experience of tribal lawyers. In this vein, Rennard Strickland once retold
the following story:
There was an Osage legend or prophecy which said that the white man
would bring something with him that was of great value but that he would
not know how to use it and that the Indian would take it and add to it and
change it and that it would then be good and true and pure. Some say that
this was Christianity and that when the Indian joined peyote with this new
Christian religion that the prophecy was fulfilled. I think the same may
be true of the statute and case law which the white man brought. Our
challenge is to take that law and add to it and change it so that law can be
good and true and pure not only for Indian people but for all people.367

The Standard Conception of lawyering, and the Rules of Professional
Conduct that implement it, celebrate individualism, client autonomy, and
lawyers’ role morality. There is certainly room for such traditional
representation of tribes and other groups under this dominant model of law
practice, and tribal lawyers can also learn much from models of corporate,
government, cause, and civil rights lawyering, each of which may be
relevant to the particular legal challenges that they face. But at the end of
the day, tribes are not necessarily like the other corporations, governments,
causes, or minorities within the American legal landscape. They are Indian
tribes, each with a particular history and contemporary reality that impacts
their representation by lawyers. A theory of law practice and rules of
professional conduct that build on it must acknowledge the range and
diversity of clients, lawyers, and the relationships they form, and encourage
the development of professional ideologies that reflect the commitments
and values of lawyers for groups.
In this Article, we demonstrate that in some instances, the Standard
Conception’s norms of zealous advocacy, nonaccountability, and role
morality, as well as specific Rules of Professional Conduct, ill fit and
poorly guide the practice of tribal lawyers. Indeed, effective representation
rather than zealous advocacy, client empowerment rather than lawyer
nonaccountability, and tribal identity may be relevant factors in the
relationship between lawyers and tribes. We argue that the experience of
tribal lawyers compellingly challenges the dominant ideology and the
Rules, and suggests not only the need to rethink and reimagine some
aspects of the regulatory apparatus but also the professional ideology that
legitimizes it.368 With the experience of legal oppression, and the ongoing
367. RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTO’S REVENGE 119–20 (1997).
368. See John Levin, Native American Issues and Legal Ethics, CBA REC. (Sept. 2012),
http://www.johnlevin.info/legalethics/article/native-american-issues-and-legal-ethics
(suggesting increased awareness of American Indian issues offers insights that would benefit
all lawyers about the ways in which “law—as an institution—categorizes people and the
effect of that categorization when reflected back on society”).
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commitment to community, tribes suggest additional conceptions of law
and means of practicing it. The alternative conceptions described in this
Article reflect tribes’ particular experiences with conquest and colonization,
their status as political sovereigns, and the current movement of tribal selfdetermination in governance, culture, and socioeconomics. More broadly,
however, the representation of tribes suggests that all groups and even
individuals may benefit from the emergence of alternative models of legal
practice that make room for the values, identities, and experiences of groups
and their lawyers.

